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ABSTRACT 
One potential scenario regarding the future of North Korea is state collapse and 
unification with South Korea.  Effectively isolated from the international community and 
the world economy, bereft of the great power patronage that it once enjoyed from the 
Soviet Union and China, and enduring economic shortages and distress, Pyongyang faces 
challenges that may cumulatively lead to its dissolution.  Were collapse to occur, many 
surmise, unification with the South seems a plausible consequence and many South 
Koreans expect the consequence. 
However, unification of the Korean peninsula by the South’s absorption of the 
North, faces numerous obstacles.  There are many possible legal and institutional issues 
that would be raised by collapse of North Korea and that would in turn figure into 
prospects for unification with the South. 
These include: 
• South and North Korea’s membership as sovereign states in the United 
Nations; 
• Historical issues stemming from the Korean War, including the continuing 
relevance of the United Nations and Combined Forces Commands; and 
• Legal stipulation incorporated into past North-South agreements, such as 
the “Inter-Korean Basic Agreement.” 
Adding to the complexity of these issues is the geopolitical context in which their 
resolution must be addressed.  In addition to the goals and policies of Seoul and 
Washington in dealing with state collapse in North Korea, the concerns and approaches 
of Beijing, Moscow, and Tokyo will also have an impact on how these legal and 
institutional questions are solved. 
 Given these complex issues, it is not a foregone conclusion that North Korea, 
following collapse, may easily be incorporated into a unified Korean state under Seoul’s 
direction.  Therefore, I suggest that the South Korean government needs to prepare for a 
 vi
North Korean collapse which could lead a possibly unified Korea.  The suggestions for 
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Most South Koreans think that if North Korea collapses, South Korea can 
intervene in a collapsed North Korea and the two Koreas will naturally become a unified 
Korea.  Unfortunately, this is not necessarily true.  According to international law, a state 
cannot intervene in a collapsed state except for cases when a state was to intervene in a 
collapsed state for the purpose of self-defense, when the collapsed state asks a state to 
intervene, or with the United Nations’ approval.  However, neither the international 
situation nor the North Korean situation is favorable for South Korean intervention in a 
collapsed North Korea.  The United States may want to control a collapsed North Korea 
under the name of the United Nations as it did in 1950.  If the United States controls a 
collapsed North Korea, this may bring Chinese and Russian intervention and the Korean 
Peninsula could become an arena of competition of the great power states as it was 
during the Korean War.  If this happens, it will be difficult for Korea to realize its wish of 
unification.  Also, even though North Korea has been suffering from severe economic 
difficulty and international sanctions, there are no signs of giving up its dictatorship. 
Instead, it has responded with brinkmanship.  As a result, there is little possibility of a 
collapsing North Korea asking South Korea to intervene.  Therefore, the South Korean 
government’s policy planning is urgently needed to absorb a collapsed North Korea.  To 
suggest the South Korean government’s policies which would lead a collapsed North 
Korea to a unified Korea, this thesis will try to answer the following questions: 
•  Why would North Korea not automatically be part of South Korea? 
•  Will North Korea collapse?  
•  Why does South Korea need to absorb a collapsed North Korea? 




•  What does the South Korean government need to do to prepare for North 
Korean collapse? (Figure 1, Main thesis question) 
When South Korea unifies with a collapsed North Korea, the questions of state 
succession arise: whether treaties, debts, and territory are passed to unified Korea or not, 
whether a unified Korea needs to join the UN with the name of Unified Korea or not, and 
what possible problems will arise if South Korea absorbs North Korea.  Therefore, I will 
try to answer these questions concerning succession of states, which South Korea will be 
confronted with if it absorbs a collapsed North Korea.  Also, I will research cases of state 
succession to find the answers about state succession. 
 
 









Things to do to 
prepare for collapse 




B. WHY WOULD A COLLAPSED NORTH KOREA NOT 
AUTOMATICALLY BECOME PART OF SOUTH KOREA? 
I will describe the historical background to explain why North Korea might not 
become part of South Korea if North Korea collapses.  
South Korea and North Korea joined the United Nations at the same time in 
August 1991.  This means that the United Nations and other international societies 
recognize North Korea as a state which has its own sovereignty.  This is totally different 
from South Korean thinking about North Korea--that South and North Korea are not 
separate states.  This thinking is based on the South Korean Constitution, Article 3.1  It 
stipulates that North Korean territory is part of South Korean territory which has not yet 
been recovered.  Because both Koreas joined the United Nations and are recognized as 
independent states, South Korea cannot intervene in a collapsed North Korea, and also, a 
collapsed North Korea cannot be part of South Korea automatically. 
The South Korean government handed over “Operational Control (OPCON)” to 
the United Nations during the Korean War in July 1950.  So when the United Nations 
forces marched to North Korea, they were controlled not by the South Korean 
government, but by the United Nations Forces Command.2  This gives just reason to the 
United Nations Forces for controlling North Korea and makes it difficult for South Korea 
to insist on controlling North Korea if North Korea loses its state control.  Because South 
Korea did not have OPCON when the United Nations took control of part of North Korea 
in October 1950, South Korean president, Rhee Syngman, had to visit that part of North 
Korea not as South Korean president, but as an individual.3  This is one of the reasons  
 
 
                                                 
1 The Constitution of South Korea, Article 3 says that its territory consisting of “the Korean Peninsula 
and its adjacent islands.”   
2 Illyoung Kim, "The Korean Military's Roles and Limitations when North Korea Collapses," Defense 
Research 46, no. 2 (2003), 142.     




that support recovering OPCON.  Even though South Korea will get back wartime 
OPCON in 2012, the Korean War case is not helpful to South Korea to take leadership in 
a collapsed North Korea. 
Also, the “Inter-Korean Basic Agreement (1991)”4 adds another reason.  Article 
Two of the “Inter-Korean Basic Agreement” says South and North Korea cannot 
intervene in each other’s inter-state problems.  Therefore, South Korea cannot intervene 
if North Korea is about to collapse unless there is an official request from North Korea.5  
The other reason is the resolution of the United Nations Security Council, made 
on June 27, 1950: 
Having noted from the report of the United Nations Commission on Korea 
that the authorities in North Korea have neither ceased hostilities nor 
withdrawn their armed forces to the 38th parallel, and that urgent military 
measures are required to restore international peace and security … 
Following this resolution, the United States and other nations started dispatching troops 
and giving military support.  But this resolution has a significant meaning.  The United 
States military used the phrase “to restore international peace and security” as a just 
reason to cross over the 38th parallel and march into North Korea during the Korean War.  
So this historical event gave another just reason for the United States military to have 
control of North Korea if North Korea collapses. 
There are more reasons not mentioned here, such as the Chinese intervention, the 
possibility of a United States military operation against North Korea without South 




                                                 
4 It is the document that South and North Korea agreed with reconciliation, inviolability, cooperation, 
and so on December 13, 1991 in Seoul. 




Korea’s strong volition to maintain their state authorities in a unified Korea. 6  7  These 
issues will be discussed in Chapter IV. 
C. HYPOTHESIS 
A collapse of North Korea may not necessarily lead to a unified Korea.  It is 
affected by complex external and internal contexts.  Therefore, the South Korean 
government needs to prepare for a North Korean collapse.  These efforts should be made 
in political, diplomatic, military, and domestic areas. 
 
Figure 2.   Hypothesis 
                                                 
6 Minkwon Nam, 21st Century Northeast Asian Situation and Korea's National Security Strategy 
(Seoul: Research Institute of Asian-Pacific Problems, 2003), 9-14.     
7 Each country’s volition about unification is shown in the South Korean Constitution, Article 4, and 
the North Korean Constitution, Article 103. 
•  Political/diplomatic area 
- Influences of the four big states 
- Reducing political conflict between two 
Koreas 
•  Military area 
- U.S.-DPRK military conflict 
- North Korean nuclear weapons 
- ROK-U.S. military alliance 
-    Intervention of South Korean military 
- Readiness of Korean military 
•  Social/economic area 
- The costs of unification 
-    Social and religious differences 
-    Unification education 










D. CHAPTER SUMMARIES 
This thesis will consist of five chapters.  The introduction describes the purpose of 
the thesis and addresses the main problems it seeks to address.  It also describes the 
historical background of the main problems and then summarizes the main points. 
The second chapter analyzes the meaning of collapse of state and the possibility 
of North Korean collapse, which is the premise for my main thesis question. 
 The third chapter assesses theories of state succession and historical cases of 
succession of state.  I research both in international practice, as well as the conventional 
law and two conventions which regulate succession of state.  Also, I analyze whether the 
theories can be applied to the North Korean case or not.  The historical case focuses on 
German unification, which has the most similarity to the Korean reunification case. 
The fourth chapter suggests the role of the South Korean government in preparing 
for state succession on the Korean peninsula.  The areas in which the South Korean 
government needs to prepare are three areas: political and diplomatic, military, and social 
and economic.  Each area is analyzed by positive and negative factors for South Korean 
succession of North Korea. 
The last chapter is the conclusion.  I summarize my thesis question and arguments 




II. WILL NORTH KOREA COLLAPSE? 
A. MEANING OF COLLAPSE OF STATE 
A state consists of a government, people, and territory. Generally, collapse of a 
state means collapse of government. Therefore, the legal meaning of collapse of a state is 
collapse of government.  The political and social science meaning of collapse of a state 
includes collapse of political power, collapse of power, and collapse of the system.8  For 
example, East Germany was a case of collapse of political power, collapse of power, and 
collapse of system, but the Soviet Union was a case of collapse of political power, and 
collapse of power. 
Usually, collapse of state means “the inability of the regime in power to maintain 
effective political, economical, social, and military control, which ultimately leads to its 
dissolution and, in the extreme case, the formal end of the state.”9 
B. POSSIBILITY OF COLLAPSE OF NORTH KOREA 
What situation would qualify as the collapse of North Korea?  If the Kim Jong-il 
regime collapses, does North Korea collapse?  Or, if the North Korean government 
system collapses, does North Korea collapse?  The Kim Jong-il regime collapse does not 
necessarily mean the collapse of North Korea, but there is a great possibility for the 
collapse of North Korea if the Kim Jong-il regime collapses.  Because defining the 
collapse of North Korea is complex, I will say that the collapse of North Korea is a 
specific situation when North Korea needs another state’s military intervention because 
of sudden change in North Korea.10 
                                                 
8 Bongdo Gi, "Problem of International Law in the Case of Merger of North Korea Resulting from 
North Korean Collapse," Research of North Korea 1, (1998), 77.     
9 Jonathan D. Pollack and Chung Min Lee, Preparing for Korean Unification : Scenarios and 
Implications (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999), 59. 




Will North Korea really collapse soon?  The possibility of North Korea’s collapse 
has been more seriously considered since the mid-1990s, and the North Korean nuclear 
weapon crisis and serious economic difficulty exacerbated this consideration.  After the 
Collins’11 report was issued, consideration of a North Korean collapse has been 
considered more.  The report said North Korea was in the 3rd and 4th steps of the 
collapse process that consisted of 7 steps12: (1) resource exhaustion → (2) discrimination 
of distribution → (3) regional independence action → (4) suppression → (5) resistance 
→ (6) dissolution → (7) reorganization of leadership.  
Also, there are some main symptoms that indicate North Korea is facing 
collapse.13  The symptoms are food shortages, increasing defection from North Korea, 
and antagonism between Kim Jong-il and the North Korean military. 
The ROK Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry announced that North Korea will 
have a food shortage of 2,490,000 tons in 2008.  Food distribution in North Korea has 
been reduced so that the amount of food distribution is half of the 488 grams per a day 
which North Korea is presented to supply to their people.14  Even the North Korean 
government takes some amount of food from the daily distribution for the reason of 
saving.  The North Korean food shortage is leading to anarchy.15  Hungry North Koreans 
may revolt against the North Korean government and this may lead to collapse of the 
North Korean government. 
                                                 
11 Previous ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command. 
12 Jeajin Seo, “Collins’ report about the collapse of North Korea” Chosun Monthly 5 (1996): 364-381. 
13 Younglim Kim, "Collapse of Kim, Jong Il Regime in Six Month?" KONASNET, 
http://www.konas.net/article/article.asp?idx=13600 (accessed 02/22/2008).    The famous England journal 
‘Jane’s Defence Weekly’ reported that Kim, Jong-il regime may collapse in six months(‘Clock ticking for 
Kim’s Korea’) in January 24, 2008. Also, this journal said, “China was prepared to "take the initiative" and 
had a military strategy for securing North Korea's "loose nukes" should Kim Jong-Il's rule fail.” 
14 Sooyoung Choi, "Facts and Prospect of the Food Shortage of North Korea," 25th Domestic 
Conference (1997), 16.     
15 Selig S. Harrison, Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disengagement 




The number of defections from North Korean is rapidly increasing.  The 
Unification Ministry of South Korea announced that the number of defections was 148 in 
1999, but the number increased to 583 in 2001 and 1,141 in 2002.  Similarly, many East 
Germans also crossed the Berlin Wall before East German collapsed.  The North Korean 
government has almost lost control of defections.  Even though the North Korean 
government orders North Korea border guards to shoot to kill anyone who crosses into 
China, the number of defections has increased.16  China already moved many troops to 
the border area between China and North Korea to prepare for mass defection from North 
Korea in case of a North Korean collapse. 
There is possibility of the Kim Jong-il regime being changed by the North Korean 
military.  There was an opposition group in the military hierarchy when Kim Jong-il was 
chosen as Kim Il-sung’s successor.17  Therefore, Kim Jong-il needs military support to 
sustain his regime.  The more North Korea suffers economic failure, food shortages, and 
the problem of increasing defections, the more Kim Jong-il needs military support.  
However, Kim Jong-il has no military experience to lead the military and old military 
leaders are dissatisfied because of politicians’ undervaluation of them.  So they may 
decide to push Kim Jong-il aside. 
There was another idea about a North Korean collapse.  In 1993, while William J. 
Perry was Defense Secretary of the United States, he said that North Korea would 
collapse “some time in the next few years.”  However, after a visit to North Korea six 
years later, he concluded that “the regime is very much in control, and it would be 
imprudent on our part to assume that this regime is going to collapse.  We have to deal 
with the North Korean government not as we wish they’d be but as, in fact, they are.”18  
Expecting North Korea to collapse can be controversial, but as a South Korean military 
                                                 
16 Paul French, North Korea : The Paranoid Peninsula--a Modern History (London ; New York; New 
York: Zed Books; Distributed in the USA by Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 258-259.     
17 Ibid., 264. 




officer, considering and preparing for the collapse of North Korea is worthwhile. 
Considering and preparing for the collapse of North Korea is worthwhile for the South 




III. THEORIES AND HISTORICAL CASES 
A. SUCCESSION OF STATE 
1. Definition of Succession of States 
Succession of State can be defined as “the replacement of one State by another in 
the responsibility for the international relations of territory.”19  It means the responsibility 
of a state for a territory is transferred from Predecessor State, “the State which has been 
replaced by another State on the occurrence of a succession of States,”20 to Successor 
State, “the State which has replaced another State on the occurrence of a succession of 
State.”21  State succession is not a common case in the world society, so not many 
international rules have appeared yet.  Therefore, state succession is very controversial in 
the world society.22 
The questions of state succession arise when a new state is established, a state is 
divided into several states, or several states are merged into one state.23  The questions 
are mostly about rights and obligations between a predecessor state and a successor state. 
State succession can be both universal and partial succession.24  Universal 
succession occurs when a state absorbs one or more states by either conquest or 
spontaneous merger.  Also, universal succession occurs either when a state is split and 
makes new separate states or when states are annexed by other states.  Partial succession 
                                                 
19 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts, 
(1983): Par 1 Article 2(a).     
20  Ibid., Part 1 Article 2(b). 
21  Ibid., 2(c). 
22 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 5th ed. (Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press; 
Oxford University Press, 1998), 650.     
23  William L. Tung, International Law in an Organizing World (New York: Crowell, 1968), 56.     
24  L. Oppenheim and Hersh Lauterpacht Sir, International Law : A Treatise, 8th ed. (London, New 




takes place either when part of a state becomes an independent state or when a state 
obtains a part of the territory of another state. Partial succession takes place when a state 
loses independence partly due to joining a federal state. 
The ways to categorize succession of state varies, but there are approximately five 
types of succession of state:25 
•  Dissolution: when a state collapses and then breaks into several independent 
states (e.g., The Soviet Union) 
•  Fusion: when several same level states become one state (e.g., North and South 
Yemen) 
•  Cession: when a part of a state’s territory is transferred to another state (e.g., 
Transferring Alaska from Russia to the United States) 
•  Secession: when a part of a state becomes an independent state (e.g., 
Independence of East Pakistan from Bangladesh) 
•  Merger: when a state is absorbed by another state spontaneously (e.g., 
Germany) 
2. Application of Succession of State to South and North Korea 
Can the succession of state theory be applied to South and North Korea?  There 
are two problems related to this question.  Firstly, did succession of state occur between 
the Korean Empire26 and Korea?27  Secondly, are South and North Korea recognized as 
separately independent states in the world society?28  How do both Koreas recognize 
each other? 
                                                 
25  Ki-Gab Park, "The State Succession with Respect to Treaties Focusing on the Models of Unified 
Korea," Hanlim Law Forum 5, no. 1 (1996), 103.     
26 Korean Empire was the name of Korea from October 12, 1897 to Japan’s annexation of Korea on 
August 28, 1910. 
27 Deokgyu Im, "The Legitimacy of the Republic of Korea," Korean Military Academy Thesis Book 
24 (1983), 132.     





The Korean Empire lost state sovereignty after the conclusion of the “Eulsa 
Treaty”29 and the “Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty.”30  Therefore, the problem of state 
succession among South and North Korea and Korean Empire depends on validity of 
these two treaties.31  A document written by Sunjong32 was found on August 27, 1993. 
The document was written the day before the signing of the “Japan-Korea Annexation 
Treaty,” and this document expresses Sunjong’s will of disagreement about the inequality 
of the treaty.33  Because the treaty was signed by compulsion of Japan, it is not valid.34  
Additionally, because Korea and Japan have agreed that treaties concluded before August 
22, 1910 are invalid,35 the two treaties are ineffective.  As a result, the Korean Empire 
was not eliminated because the treaties between Korean and Japan are invalid, but instead 
the exercising of the sovereignty by the Korean Empire was reserved from 1910 (the 
starting point of Japan’s control) to 1948 (establishing point of Korean government). 
Also, treaties concluded during Japan’s control are all invalid.36 
Therefore, how can the establishment of South and North Korea be explained? 
There are two possible explanations.37  The first explanation says South Korea is the 
successor state of the Korean Empire, and then North Korea separated from South Korea. 
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The second explanation says South and North Korea are both successor states of the 
Korean Empire. Both South and North Korea each insist on identities that the most 
benefit to itself and denies the other.  
The establishment of the South Korean government began with the Shanghai 
Provisional Government on April 13, 1919, and from that time the name of the state was 
changed from the Korean Empire to the Republic of Korea.38 But this government was 
located in China, not in Korea, and exercised very limited government power.  After 
Japan’s defeat on August 15, 1945, the Korean government was unable to be immediately 
established, instead, the United States and the Soviet Union’s control both in the South 
and North began. Because Korea was controlled by a trusteeship of both the United 
States and the Soviet Union, and the Shanghai Provisional Government was dismissed, 
the Korean government was not fully functional, but Korea still had sovereignty as a 
successor state of the Korean Empire. The first members of the National Assembly were 
elected on May 10, 1948 and the Constitution of the Republic of Korea and the South 
Korean government were established on July 17, 1948 and August 15, 1948, respectively.  
The Constitution of the Republic of Korea says, “…traditions dating from time 
immemorial, upholding the cause of the Provisional Republic of Korea Government born 
of the March First Independence Movement of 1919…” so that the line of succession is 
the Korean Empire, the Shanghai Provisional Government, and the South Korean 
government. Then, is South Korea the only lawful government in the Korean peninsula?  
The “Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea” says in Article 
3, “It is confirmed that the Government of the Republic of Korea is the only lawful 
Government in Korea as specified in the Resolution 195 (III) of the United Nations 
General Assembly” Article 3 also says, “The territory of the Republic of Korea shall 
consist of the Korean peninsula and its adjacent islands” so that the South Korean 
government insists that South Korea is the only the legitimate state on the Korean 
peninsula. But the election in 1948 took place only in a part of the Korean peninsula, 
                                                 




south of the 38th parallel, so it is controversial whether South Korea is the only lawful 
government on the Korean peninsula or not.39 
The North Korean government was established on September 9, 1948, but both 
South and North Korea insist that their government is the only the legitimate government. 
Since South and North Korea joined the United Nations in September 1991, both 
countries should admit that the world society recognizes South and North Korea as 
separated independent states. But, even though South and North Korea joined the United 
Nations, it does not mean that South and North Korea recognize each other as a state.40 
The relation of South and North Korea is called a “Special Relation.”41 The term “Special 
Relation” originated from Willy Brandt, previous Chancellor of West Germany from 
1969 to 1974.  
He said “Even though there are two states in Germany, they are not foreign states 
to each other. They have just special relations.”42 Externally, South and North Korea are 
two states, but internally they are one state. Because South and North Korea are separated 
into two states externally, succession of state can be applied if North Korea collapses. 
B. THEORIES OF SUCCESSION OF STATE 
1. International Practice and the Conventional Law 
In international practice and conventional law, theory of succession of state is 
applied in the respects of “personal treaty” and “territorial treaty.”43  The term “personal 
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treaty” refers to treaties made by predecessor states and have no political continuity 
between predecessor state and successor state.  The term “personal treaty” includes 
treaties of alliance, military base agreements, criminal extradition treaties, and so on.  
Treaties concluded by predecessor states are not passed to successor states according to 
the “clean slate rule.”44   But if there is political continuity, such as with merging, the 
treaties which the predecessor state made are passed to the successor state.45 On the other 
hand, with “territorial treaties” which regulate rights and obligations concerning territory, 
voyage/transport/fishery treaties are passed to the successor state; this is the “rule of 
continuity.”46  But “newly independent states” apply either the “clean slate rule” or the 
“rule of continuity” depending on their benefits.47  Then, what about treaties concluded 
by a successor state before uniting with a predecessor state?  Will the treaties have effect 
on the predecessor state’s territory?  According to the “moving treaty-frontier rule,” the 
answer is yes.48 
2. Conventions 
There are two Vienna Conventions which regulated succession of state.  One is 
the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, 1978 and the other 
is the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives 
and Debts, 1983.  But these two conventions apply “to the effects of a succession of 
States in respect of treaties between States.”49 Some may wonder whether or not these 
conventions can be applied to Korea which is a divided state.  Even though South and 
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North Korea do not recognize each other as individual states, they joined the United 
Nations as individual states. Therefore, these conventions can apply to both Koreas. Also, 
international law applied to East and West Germany before they unified, so this fact 
shows that it can applied to South and North Korea, as well. 
a. Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect to 
Treaties 
“A succession of States does not affect a boundary established by a treaty 
or obligations and rights established by a treaty and relating to the regime of a 
boundary.”50  This convention follows the “principle of sanctity of frontiers” so the 
treaties concerning frontiers are passed to a successor state.  On the other hand, the 
treaties concerning establishment of foreign military bases on the territory are not.51 
However, some treaties of predecessor state cease to in force.  
These include: 
•  According to the “moving treaty-frontiers rule,” when part of the territory of a 
state’s sovereignty is transferred, the territory is applied by the successor state 
and the predecessor state’s treaties are not passed to a successor state;52 
•  Newly independent states such as an independent state from a colony can 
acquire sovereignty free from the treaties the ruling state made;53 
•  “When two or more states unite and so form one successor state,” the 
predecessor state’s treaties are passed to the successor state;54 
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•  “When a part or parts of the territory of a state separate to form one or more 
states, whether or not the predecessor state continues to exist,” the predecessor 
state’s treaties are passed to all successor states, and the treaties which only a part 
of the predecessor state’s territory of is included are in force for only that part of 
the territory of the successor state.55 
b. Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect to State 
Property 
The second convention deals with state property, archives, and debts, which 
are excluded in the first convention.  
“State property of the predecessor state means property, rights, interests 
which, at the date of the succession of states, were, according to the international law of the 
predecessor state, owned by that state.”56   The predecessor state’s property is passed to the 
successor state without compensation except when proper international organization decides 
differently, or a third state owns the property.57 Also, “when two or more states unite and so 
form one successor state,” the property of the predecessor state shall pass to the successor 
state.58 
“State archives of the predecessor state means all documents of whatever date 
and kind, produced or received by the predecessor state in the exercise of its functions which, 
at the date of the succession of states, belonged to the predecessor state according to its 
internal law and were preserved by it directly or under its control as archives for whatever 
purpose.”59 The predecessor state’s archives pass to the successor state without 
compensation except when related states make an agreement on a different way, a proper 
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international organization decides differently, or a third state owns the archives in the 
predecessor state’s  territory.  Also, “when two or more states unite and so form one 
successor state,” the archives of the predecessor state pass to the successor state.60 
“State debt means any financial obligation of a predecessor state arising in 
conformity with international law towards another state, an international organization or any 
other subject of international law.”61  “When part of the territory of a state is transferred by 
that state to another state,” the predecessor state’s debt passes to the successor state by 
agreement between them.62  If there is no such agreement, the predecessor state’s debt shall 
pass to the successor state “in an equitable proportion, taking into account, in particular, the 
property, rights and interests which pass to the successor state in relation to that state 
debt.”63 “When two or more states unite and so form one successor state,” the predecessor 
state’s debt passes to the successor state.64 
3. Application of the Theories to Korea 
a. Problems of Military Intervention on Collapsed North Korea 
According to international law, a state can intervene in a collapsing state if 
the two states are in warfare relations.65 Because South Korea is in armistice with the North, 
South Korea can intervene in a collapsed North Korea.  But, as I mentioned in Chapter I, 
South and North Korea are in “special relations.”  “Special relations” means that North Korea 
is not a state in South Korea’s point of view and vice versa.  So because South and North 
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Korea are each not a state in each other’s point of view, the international law is not applied to 
both Koreas.  Also, according to the “Inter-Korean Basic Agreement,” South and North 
Korea cannot intervene in each other’s international problems.  In this way, South Korea 
cannot intervene in a collapsed North Korea.  The only exception would be if intervention 
were requested by North Korea, though this exception would also require that South Korea 
had “Wartime Operational Control.” However, South Korea does not have “Wartime 
Operation Control” so intervention in a collapsed North Korea is still impossible at the 
present time. 
Can the ROK-U.S. combined military intervene in a collapsed North Korea?  
Because the ROK-U.S. combined military is in a warfare situation with North Korea, the 
ROK-U.S. combined military can intervene according to international law.  However, ROK-
U.S. combined military is based on the “Mutual Defense Treaty (1954),” so it can intervene 
in North Korea only when there is a military attack from North Korea.66 Therefore, the 
ROK-U.S. combined military cannot intervene in a collapsed North Korea except at North 
Korea’s request. Also, the ROK-U.S. combined commander does not have “Wartime 
Operation Control,” but the United Nations Forces Command has “Wartime Operation 
Control” so ROK-U.S. combined military cannot intervene in collapsed North Korea. 
This leads to the question, can a United Nations force intervene in a collapsed 
North Korea?  The Charter of the United Nations, Article 39 says “The Security Council shall 
determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression 
and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with 
Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security” so in the case of 
“any threat to the peace, breach of the peach, or act of aggression” the United Nations forces 
can intervene in a state.  Therefore, if North Korea collapses and make any of the types of 
threats mentioned in the Article 39, United Nations forces can intervene in a collapsed North 
Korea.  But the Charter of the United Nations does not define what the “threat to the peace, 
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breach of the peace, or act of aggression” is, so the United Nations Security Council needs to 
decide whether North Korea has committed any of the acts against the Charter of the United 
Nations.67  Therefore, intervention of United Nations forces in a collapsed North Korea is 
possible if China or Russia do not use veto power as permanent members of the United 
Nations Security Council.  However, there is a possibility of United Nations forces 
intervention without the United Nations Security Council’s decision.  United Nations forces 
which are in South Korea can intervene in a collapsed North Korea because the United 
Nations Security Council already concluded United Nations forces’ military intervention in 
North Korea in 1950. 
b. Succession of International Organization Membership 
If North Korea collapses and becomes part of South Korea, how will the 
membership in international organizations change?  After absorbing a collapsed North Korea, 
South Korea still has sovereignty of state, so South Korea’s membership in international 
organizations is maintained.  In contrast, North Korea would lose its membership in 
international organizations because of the loss of sovereignty of state.  Germany is a good 
example. East and West Germany joined the United Nations in 1973 and united in 1990. 
There was no official joining of unified Germany, but the unified Germany was able to 
maintain membership in the United Nations.  More detailed examples of state succession will 
be provided in the next chapter. 
c. Legal Problems Concerning State Succession 
There will be many legal problems in unified Korea, but I will focus on the 
main two problems: debts and treaties. 
North Korea’s debts to capitalist states, including Japan, Germany, France, 
and so on, total 49.2 hundred million dollars; debts to ex-socialist states, including China, 
Russia, the Czech Republic, and so on, total 75.4 hundred million dollars. The total debt is 
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more than 12 billion dollars as of 2001.  The debts from western states are mostly principle 
and interest of mining equipment and petro chemical equipment during the 6 years economy 
paining period from 1971 to 1976. The debts from ex-socialist states are mostly loans for 
post-war recovery in the 1950s and a trade deficit.  North Korea’s debts are 79.4% of its GNP 
in 2001, so it exceeded IMF’s debts danger limit of 48% of GNP.  North Korea has already 
lost its ability of repayment.68 
 
Table 1.   Debt of North Korea 
(unit: one hundred million dollars, %) 
YEAR G N P DEBT DEBT / GNP 
1990 231 78.6 34.0 
1991 329 92.8 40.5 
1992 211 97.2 46.2 
1993 205 103.2 50.3 
1994 212 106.6 50.3 
1995 223 118.3 53.0 
1996 214 120.0 56.1 
1997 177 119.0 67.2 
1998 126 121.0 96.0 
1999 158 122.9 77.8 
2000 168 124.6 74.2 
2001 157 124.6 79.4 
Source: The Bank of Korea69 
According to the Vienna Convention in 1983, there is a much greater 
possibility that North Korea’s debts pass to South Korea if South Korea absorbs North 
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Korea.  The debts would be a heavy burden to unified Korea with the cost of 
reunification ultimately ranging from 182.7 billion dollars to 2 trillion dollars.70   
As of 2006, South Korea has 1,850 bilateral treaties and 540 multilateral 
treaties.71  North Korea has approximately 70 bilateral treaties and 75 multilateral treaties 
as of 1982.72 Among North Korea’s treaties, the treaties concerning the shared frontier 
with Russia and China can be controversial.  North Korea concluded a treaty concerning 
the frontier with Russia in 1990, but “Nokdun-do”73 was not included in the treaty.  Qing 
and Japan decided North and East Gando would belong to Chinese territory in the Gando 
Convention.  Because Japan had responsibility for Korea’s foreign affairs according to 
the Eulsa Treaty, Japan and Qing concluded the Convention. But, the Eulsa Treaty is a 
void treaty so the Gando Convention is void, too. 
C. HISTORICAL CASES OF SUCCESSION OF STATES 
German unification was completed when the German Democratic Republic 
(GDR) and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) signed the Unification Treaty 
between the FRG and the GDR in Berlin on August 31, 1990.  Unified Germany 
followed not the Vienna Conventions, but international practice and the conventional law 
when it dealt with the state succession problem. 
Article 11 of the unification treaty says, “The Contracting Parties proceed on the 
understanding that international treaties and agreements to which the Federal Republic of 
Germany is a contracting party, including treaties establishing membership of 
international organizations or institutions, shall retain their validity and that the rights and 
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obligations…”74 Therefore, the treaties the FRG made before unification are still valid in 
unified Germany according to the “moving treaty-frontier rule.”  Also, there are Articles 
concerning the treaties the predecessor state concluded before unification.  Article 12 
says “The Contracting Parties are agreed that, in connection with the establishment of 
German unity, international treaties of the German Democratic Republic shall be 
discussed with the contracting parties concerned with a view to regulating or confirming 
their continued application, adjustment or expiry, …” and also says, “Should the united 
Germany intend to accede to international organizations or other multilateral treaties of 
which the German Democratic Republic but not the Federal Republic of Germany is a 
member, agreement shall be reached with the respective contracting parties and with the 
European Communities where the latter's competence is affected.”75 Accordingly, unified 
German decided whether or not it would honor the treaties by having discussions with 
related states or organizations.   
Concerning public assets, the Unification Treaty, Article 21 says “The assets of 
the German Democratic Republic which are used directly for specific administrative 
purposes (administrative assets) shall become federal assets unless their designated 
purpose as of October 1, 1989 was primarily to meet administrative responsibilities 
which, under the Basic Law, are to be exercised by Länder, communes (associations of 
communes) or other agencies of public administration.”76  As a result, communes or other 
agencies of public administration had priority of public assets.   
Additionally, concerning debts, Article 23 says, “Upon the accession taking 
effect, the total debts of the central budget of the German Democratic Republic which 
have accumulated up to this date shall be taken over by a federal Special Fund without  
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legal capacity, which shall meet the obligations arising from debt servicing. The Special 
Fund shall be empowered to raise loans.”77  So the unified Germany took over the GDR’s 
debts. 
The GDR and the FRG joined the United Nations in 1973 separately.  After the 
GDR and the FRG unified, unified Germany succeeded to the membership of the United 
Nations. 
There are other historical cases of state succession.  Egypt and Syria were merged 
on February 1, 1958, Tanganyika and Zanzibar were merged on April 22, 1964, and 
Senegal and Gambia were merged on December 17, 1981.  Each case had almost the 
same type of state succession, but each one had a few differences.  Details of the type of 
state succession are shown in Table 2. 
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Table 2.   Succession types of Germany, United Arab Republic, United Republic of 
Tanzania, and Senegambia78 












In force In force In force In force 
Debts In force In force Not in force In force 
                                                 




IV. HOW SHOULD SOUTH KOREA PREPARE? 
A. POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC AREAS 
1. Influences of the Four Big States 
a. The United States 
 
Figure 3.   Influences of the Four Big States – the United States 
(1)  United States’ policies toward DPRK.  The George W. Bush 
administration has been conflicted with two ideologies concerning policy toward North 
Korea, neo-conservatism (oppressive policy) and realism (engagement policy).  Also, 
these two ideologies have given the important criterion to decide the direction and means 
of North Korean policies. The first Bush administration was influenced by neo-
conservatism, but realism had more impact on the second Bush administration than neo-
conservatism.79 
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•  Engagement policy toward DPRK 
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The first use of the term ‘neo-conservatism’ was in the early 
1970s. Neo-conservatism is also called ‘neocon.’ Neo-conservatism gives political 
criterion as follows: first, United States security should be reinforced to maintain the its 
leadership in the world; second, the United States should increase military power to that 
point that the other states cannot even think about having military power superior to that 
of the United States; third, the United States can use military power to spread its 
democratic values and system when using military power is necessary; fourth, the United 
States should not use an appeasement policy or engagement policy for the ‘bad states’ 
which spread WMD and support international terrorists, but use its power and change 
those regimes into democratic regimes.80 Like these political criterion, neo-conservatism 
supports active intervention for international affairs.  Neo-conservatism supporters in the 
Bush administration are Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Richard Perle, Lynne V. 
Cheney, and Paul Wolfwitz.81 
According to realism, United States foreign policy criterion should 
be as such: first, reinforcing national security; second, in order to reinforce national 
security, the United States should utilize the chance of increasing national power and 
avoid wasting national power; third, the United States should prevent other states from 
having national power superior to that of the United States.82  
Followers of realism share some values with neocons. Realists also 
think the United States should have superiority of national power and security.  
Therefore, their priority is maintaining the superpower position and preventing the rise of 
potential competitive states.  But realists think ideals or ethics are not important in 
foreign policy.  Realists are negative about spreading United States’ values to other 
states. Realists are strongly against using military power to spread United States’ values.  
Realists among the United States’ foreign policy makers support problem solving with 
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diplomacy rather than using military power.  Also, realists support the idea of receiving 
ally cooperation.83  The main realists in the Bush administration are Colin Powell, Mark 
Grossman, Condoleezza Rice, Robert Zollic, and Christopher Hill.84 
Neo-conservatism was the main foreign policy criteria until 
December 2006. The Bush administration used an oppressive policy to make North 
Korea abandon its nuclear plan. After 9·11 in 2001, the pressure on North Korea was 
increased.  President Bush called North Korea one of the ‘Axis of Evil’ states and he 
imposed economic sanctions on North Korea. The second nuclear crisis made the 
situation worse. After the nuclear crisis, Bush said that he would not have discussions 
with North Korea unless North Korea abandoned the nuclear plan first. He also 
strengthened economic sanctions. Actually, the Bush administration prepared for a 
military attack on North Korea in 2003, and made “OPLAN 5030” to force North Korea 
into collapse. But the plan was hindered by South Korea.85 
The main reasons that neo-conservatism was the United States’ 
foreign policy toward North Korea are as follows: first, Bush’s national security strategy 
supported neo-conservatism ideals; second, Bush agreed with the policy of Dick Cheney 
(the vice-president), and Donald Rumsfeld (the former Secretary of Defense) who had 
neo-conservatism ideas; and third, neo-conservatism government staff members had more 
professional knowledge of security and nuclear problems than realist government staff 
members.86 
International relations in the 21st century have been changed from 
the United States’ hegemonic and unipolarity in international relations to weak 
multipolarity in international relations.  During the Cold War era, there were two big 
                                                 
83 Kim, Bush Administration's Ideology of Foreign Policy and Policy Toward North Korea, 130. 
84 Ibid., 131. 





states: the United States and the Soviet Union. So the two states had bipolarity in 
international relations. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States became 
the strongest state, so it had unipolarity in international relations. But, in the 21st century, 
China, Russia, and the EU’s international influence have increased, so the United States’ 
hegemony has decreased. Because the United States still has more influence than China, 
Russia or the EU, I call the situation weak multipolarity in international relations. This 
change of international relations was one of the causes of the United States’ policy 
change from the oppressive policy to the engagement policy. 
Another cause of policy change was the Bush administration 
members who changed from supporting neo-conservatism to supporting realism. The first 
Bush administration’s oppressive policy toward North Korea has been criticized because 
of the unsuccessful foreign policy toward North Korea. North Korea enforced a missile 
test-fire (July 05, 2006) and a nuclear test (October 09, 2006). So United States’ citizens 
started to criticize Bush’s oppressive policy toward North Korea and support for Bush 
lessened. Also, as Democratic Party became the majority party in the off-year election in 
2006, many neo-conservative government staff members, including Donald Rumsfeld 
(the former Secretary of Defense), resigned, and realism supporters became government 
staff members. This caused Bush’s policy toward North Korea to change from an 
oppressive policy to an engagement policy.87  After realist Robert Gates became the 
Secretary of Defense, the Department of State took charge of United States foreign 
policy, which was lead by Donald Rumsfeld, the former Secretary of Defense. Therefore, 
Condoleezza Rice, the Secretary of State, lead the North Korean policy and completed 
the ‘2·13 North Korea Nuclear Agreement.’ The ‘2·13 North Korea Nuclear Agreement’ 
contributed to stabilizing the situation on the Korean peninsula. 
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(2)  ROK policy and U.S.-ROK Policy Agreement.   The term 
“Sunshine Policy” is from Aesop’s fables. In the fable, the sun could strip a traveler’s 
clothes off through warmth, but using force, the north wind could not. Kim Dae Jung’s 
“Sunshine Policy” applied the ‘Sun’s Theory’ to the policy toward North Korea. He 
believed that only warm sunshine, an engagement policy, could open North Korea’s 
closed door. According to his policy, economics and politics are separated. Therefore, 
South Korean companies could continue their business with North Korea regardless of 
the South-North political situation. Owing to this new policy, Hyundai was able to open 
the Mount Kumgang sightseeing business. This policy has three principles: (1) no 
military power provocation; (2) no unification by absorption; and    (3) the active 
promotion of reconciliation and cooperation. Also, this policy was based on four 
standpoints: (1) the North Korean system has already failed; (2) even though the North 
Korean system has failed, the possibility of an imminent North Korean collapse is 
unlikely; (3) North Korean reform is necessary and the reform has already started; and  
(4) even though the reform has started, the North Korean military first policy and 
revolution strategy will be consistent.88 Based on the “Sunshine Policy,” Kim Dae Jung 
endeavored to break up the Cold War structure on the Korean peninsula and appealed to 
the United States and Japan for support. Also, he insisted on five premises to break up the 
Cold War structure on the Korean peninsula: (1) South-North relations should be changed 
from distrustful relations to reconciliatory and cooperative relations; (2) The United 
States and Japan should normalize their relations with North Korea; (3) The international 
situation should be changed to a setting in which North Korea can have reassurance and 
be a member of the international society; (4) Nuclear weapons and WMD should be 
controlled and removed, and an arms cut should be completed; (5) The armistice system 
should be changed to a peaceful system.89 
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Kim Dae Jung’s “Sunshine Policy” contributed to peace on the 
Korean peninsula,90 recovery of inter-Korean trust, facilitation of both Korean inter-
changes and a reduction of friction with the United States and Japan concerning North 
Korean policy. However, his policy could not be rewarded with good fruits. Koreans 
criticized his policy as a one-sided policy and North Korean bellicosity was increased 
despite his policy. There were some reasons why his policy failed. 
These reasons included: 
• North Korea suspected his intentions from the beginning; 
• There was an obstacle due to hard-liners in Pyongyang; and 
• Kim Dae Jung could not get enough support from the United States. 
North Korea thought Kim Dae Jung hid his true intentions, the absorption of North 
Korea, behind the “Sunshine Policy.”91  North Korea thought Kim Dae Jung tried to court 
North Korea leaders’ good graces and finally absorb North Korea. Also, North Korean 
hard-liners were a critical obstacle in South-North relations. 
Kim Dae Jung could not get enough support from the United 
States.92  The Bush administration had an oppressive policy toward North Korea so the 
“Sunshine Policy” lost heat. Also, the Perry Report said that there was disagreement 
between South Korea and the United States concerning North Korean policy.93  The 
South Korean government used a ‘give and take’ type policy; on the other hand, the 
United States government used a ‘road map’ type policy which deals with current matters 
step by step. 
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President Roh Moo-hyun’s “Policy for Peace and Prosperity” is 
the policy that followed Kim’s “Sunshine Policy.”  President Rho’s policy toward North 
Korea is well shown in his inaugural ceremony address, ‘A New Takeoff toward an Age 
of Peace and Prosperity.’ 
I have several principles that I plan to adhere to in pushing the “Policy for 
Peace and Prosperity” on the Korean Peninsula. First, I will try to resolve 
all pending issues through dialogue. Second, I will give priority to 
building mutual trust and upholding reciprocity. Third, I will seek active 
international cooperation on the premise that South and North Korea are 
the two main actors in inter-Korean relations. And fourth, I will enhance 
transparency, expand citizen participation, and secure bipartisan support. I 
will implement my “Policy for Peace and Prosperity” with the support of 
the general public. 
“Resolving all pending issues through dialogue” was based on 
his will to solve Korean peninsula problems through dialogue in the context of possible 
incidental military conflict between South and North Korea. Solving inter-Korean 
problems through dialogue was his primary principle during his period of service in the 
presidency. Also, he emphasized the importance of international cooperation for Korean 
peninsula problems, such as North Korean nuclear weapons and unification, and that 
South and North Korea should be the main actors in dealing with Korean peninsula 
problems based on reciprocity.94 
(3)  Anti-Americanism.  Anti-Americanism has risen rapidly again 
since June 2002, when two Korean middle school girls were killed in an accident 
involving a United States panzer. (See Figure 4) 
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Figure 4.   Pro-Americanism and Anti-Americanism (From: The Department of States) 
 
Also, as we can see in Table 3, the younger people have more anti-
American sentiments.95 
Table 3.   Koreans’ anti-Americanism, 2002 
   Question: What are your feelings about the United States? 











20s 4.8% 18.3% 28.8% 41.4% 6.7% 261 
30s 2.2 19.0 38.4 35.6 4.8 275 
40s 11.1 29.8 26 29.4 3.7 208 
Above 50s 18.6 31.4 22.5 16.9 10.6 288 
Source: From RAND (2004) 
                                                 




What does anti-Americanism mean?  Korean specialists divided the meaning of anti-
Americanism into three definitions:96 
•  “Anti-America”: Some radical student groups or left-wing tendency scholars 
and journalists advocate this believe, which rejects and strongly opposes the 
United States and its policies. 
•  “Pragmatism anti-America”: People, who do not just deny the United States 
itself, but raise questions about special matters such as inequality of the 
SOFA treaty, environment problems, and handing back wartime OPCON. 
•  “Anti-America sentiments”: People who have partial dissatisfaction and 
criticism about the United States or its policies. In particular, they have the 
tendency to respond in a temporary sentimental way about sensitive matters 
which bring resistance. 
“Pragmatism anti-America” can be helpful to the relations between South Korea and the 
United States and it is natural thinking as a Korean, but “Anti-America” and “Anti-
America sentiments” are not helpful at all.  Also, these can be obstacles to Korean 
unification because these negatively effect U.S.-ROK relations.  Even though these have 
been serious issues since 2002, there has not been enough research about these issues in 
the United States and Korea.  Therefore, these questions should be researched deeply 
when the South Korean government prepares for unification.   I will call both “Anti-
America” and “Anti-America sentiments” anti-Americanism in my thesis.  
                                                 




What are the causes of anti-Americanism?  The answers can be as 
follows:97 
•  South Korea has not taught the post-Korean War generation enough about 
how the United States worked in the Korean peninsula; 
•  North Korea has had anti-American propaganda;  
•  The United States did not respond actively; and 
•  The pressures of the United States’ economic openness and USFK 
problems. 
The South Korean government has not given enough attention to teaching recent history 
to the younger generations who did not experience the Korean War.  They do not know 
much about how many American soldiers died during the Korean War and how much the 
United States helped South Korea to recover after the Korean War.  South Korean 
politicians sometimes try to use the younger generations’ anti-Americanism for their 
political purposes.  To acquire political power, change the government, and keep their 
political influence, they take advantage of anti-Americanism.  The mass media also 
encourages the younger generations’ anti-Americanism.  It does not keep the neutral 
position between pro-Americanism and anti-Americanism.  Anti-Americanism news is 
always on the front page and pro-Americanism news is always on the second page, 
because anti-Americanism news attracts readers’ attention more.  Of course, the United 
States has made mistakes, but there are also many good things the United States has done 
for South Korea.  South Korea should not just focus on the bad things the United States 
has done, but teach and publicize the good things the United States has done for South 
Korea. 
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North Korea has had propaganda maneuvers to create anti-
Americanism in South Korea.  Its purpose is encouraging anti-Americanism, withdrawing 
USFK (United States Forces Korea), and communizing the entire Korean Peninsula.  Paul 
Joseph Goebbels was a Minister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda in Nazi 
Germany.  His propaganda was accepted as true to not only Germans but also Europeans.  
North Korea has had more vicious propaganda than Goebbels.98   
The United States has been lukewarm about anti-Americanism 
problems.  Anti-American people’s insistence is that the United States is not interested in 
Korean unification.  Actually, the United States has not given any solutions concerning 
Korean unification.  Therefore, Koreans began to think that the United States does not 
want Korean unification; moreover they began to think that the United States is the 
biggest obstacle for Korean unification.  However, North Korea keeps insisting on 
Korean unification without foreign power intervention and announcing detailed plans for 
unification.  Therefore, the sensitive younger generations become anti-American and pro-
North Korea. 
As South Korea became an economic strong state, economic 
friction between the United States and ROK has been a serious problem.  Especially from 
the 1990s, the Uruguay Round (UR), World Trade Organization (WTO), International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), and Free Trade Agreements (FTA) made the problem worse.  
Particularly, importing farm products is most serious because it is related to farmers 
making a living.  Moreover, SOFA revision, moving the Yongsan Garrison, USFK 
station expenses, and importing beef has made anti-Americanism worse.  These 
economic and military disagreements made anti-Americanism spread from students to 
many fields of people. 
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What does the South Korean government need to do to prepare for 
Korean unification concerning anti-Americanism?  I will propose some suggestions.   
The suggestions are as follow: 
•  The South Korean government should educate its people to understand 
what the United States did for us so the people can correct their critical 
attitude; 
•  The South Korean government should make Washington understand the 
South Korean economic situation and encourage it not to pressure Seoul 
into economic reformation; and 
•  The South Korean government should persuade its people to understand 
the necessity of USFK and solve related problems with international 
standards. 
North Korean insistence that the Korean peninsula should be unified without intervention 
from foreign powers seems like a good idea in most Korean people’s point of view, but it 
is disregarding international situations.  The Korean peninsula cannot be unified without 
help from the surrounding four big states.  Also, without cooperation with the states, 
especially the United States, South Korea cannot anticipate unification after a North 
Korean collapse.  Therefore, unconditional and emotional anti-Americanism should be 
rejected, but constructive Pragmatic anti-Americanism should be encouraged instead of 
anti-Americanism.  For that, South Korea’s correct historical consciousness and 
cooperation between the United States and South Korea to overcome anti-Americanism 
are necessary. 
b. The People’s Republic of China 
Would China choose disturbance or acceptance for a unified Korea 
resulting from the collapse of North Korea?  What factors would cause China to reject or 




The goals of China’s domestic and foreign policies are “to build a 
harmonious society internally and a harmonious world externally.”99  China’s goal to 
build a harmonious world was shown by President Hu Jintao at the Asian-African summit 
in April 2005.  He said, “Let us make efforts to build a harmonious world based on 
sustainable peace and co-prosperity.”  Therefore, China does not want military conflict 
on the Korean peninsula and a sudden collapse of North Korea.  Also, China wants to 
increase economic power, so China has increased economic cooperation with South 
Korea since formal diplomatic relations were established on August 24, 1992. 
Will China agree or disagree with a unified Korea resulting from a 
collapse of North Korea?  It is not easy to answer this question, so I will analyze the 
positive and negative factors leading China to agree with a unified Korea, and then I will 
suggest what the South Korean government needs to do. 
 
Figure 5.   Influences of the Big Four States – People’s Republic of China   
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•  China’s military intervention 
- Sino-North Korean treaty 
- Historical experiences 
- Geopolitical problems 
- U.S. influence in Korea peninsula 
- Conflict with DPRK 




(1). Negative Factors.  China’s military intervention gives negative 
influence to a unified Korea resulting from the collapse of North Korea.  South Korea and 
the United Nations already failed to unify the Korean peninsula during the Korean War 
because of China’s military intervention.  In the same way, if there is military 
intervention by China when South Korea tries to absorb collapsed North Korea, South 
Korea might have to give up the dream of a unified Korea. 
The possible reasons for Chinese military intervention in collapsed North 
Korea are as follow: 
•  Sino-North Korea treaty; 
•  Historical experiences; 
•  Geopolitical problems;  
•  The United States influence on the Korean peninsula; 
•  Conflict with North Korea. 
In 1961, China and North Korea made the “Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and 
Mutual Assistance between the People’s Republic of China and the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea”.  This treaty gives legal rights to the Chinese military to intervene in 
North Korea.100  Therefore, China can intervene in North Korea if North Korea collapses. 
China has historical experience of intervening in North Korea. The 
most recent historical case is the Korean War.  China prepared military intervention in 
North Korea right after the United States decided to participate in the war.  So China 
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moved its troops to the border of North Korea in August 1950.101  Chinese troops then 
entered North Korea on October 19.  Why did China participate in the Korea War even 
though there was no military treaty between China and North Korea?  The reason was 
that China did not want the United States to have influence on the Korean peninsula. 
China participated in the Korean War because the United States participated in the war.  
This fact teaches an important lesson that the South Korean government should 
remember when preparing for a North Korean collapse. 
The most recent Chinese intervention previous to the Korean War 
was when Qing intervened in Chosun during the Insurrection of 1882.  At that time, Qing 
sent troops to Chosun because it worried about increasing influence of Japan in Chosun.  
Both cases show that China does not want any states to have influence on the Korea 
peninsula.   
Geopolitical problems can be the reason for Chinese intervention.  
The frontier between China and North Korea is 880 miles. This shared frontier makes up 
98.9% of the North Korean frontier.  Therefore, China has many problems.  If North 
Korea collapses, many refugees from North Korea will move to China.  China has 
already has a North Korean refugee problem, but if North Korea collapses, the problem 
will become more serious.  Therefore, China might send Chinese troops to North Korea 
to handle the problem in collapsed North Korea. 
The Korean peninsula has been the buffer zone for China.  China 
and Japan have historically had many conflicts and Japan used Korea as a stepping stone 
in the conflicts.  In the present, the U.S.-Japan alliance and the U.S.-South Korea alliance 
have been threats to Chinese socialism.  After the collapse of the Soviet Union, it would 
be difficult for China to accept another frontier contacting a socialist state’s collapse.  
China would not want that the “domino effect” to effect Chinese socialism. 
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China and North Korea have been uneasy allies. China gave a lot 
of economic and military support to North Korea when China had a rivalry with the 
Soviet Union. But, after its rival state, the Soviet Union, collapsed, China reduced 
economic and military support. China has only supported North Korea to the extent that 
barely prevents the collapse of North Korea.102 China’s behavior toward North Korea has 
changed. China started to have a pragmatic point-of-view about North Korea. If there 
were a possibility of conflict between North Korea and China, there could be three 
causes: mass defection from North Korea to China, nuclear weapons of North Korea, and 
Chinese military invention when North Korea has severe domestic confusion. 
Firstly, mass defection from North Korea is a real pain in the neck 
for China. China already moved many troops to the border area of North Korea.103 But 
the possibility of using military forces for the problem of defection from North Korea is 
low. China will try to solve this problem in a diplomatic way. Secondly, if North Korea 
proceeds with a nuclear plan, China may need military intervention to prevent North 
Korea’s nuclear plan. Thirdly, China already prepared a military strategy for North 
Korea’s implosion.104 105   North Korean economic control has already failed, the food 
distribution system is barely working, and many people are leaving North Korea. These 
signs give China the chance to consider military intervention in North Korea. 
Sino-Korean territorial problems and history distortion have been 
serious.  Gando and Baekdu Mountain have been controversial areas between China and 
South Korea. Gando is a part of Manchuria where many Koreans live.  Also, China has 
insisted that Koguryo was part of China. So China’s government mandated this Chinese 
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history guideline to the Chinese education organization for teaching Chinese history. The 
guideline says Koguryo’s history is a part of Chinese history.106  Why does China insist 
that Koguryo is a part of its history?  The reason is that China has historical concern 
about the area of Manchuria.  Manchuria became a part of China after the establishment 
of the Qing Empire.  Because South Korea has been very eager to recover the lost land, 
China worries about that.  If Korea is unified after a North Korean collapse, Korea will be 
more anxious to recover the lost land.  Therefore, China may want to maintain its current 
situation in the Korean peninsula. 
(2)  Positive Factors.  In this case, what does the South Korea need 
to prepare for Chinese issues?  The answers can be as follow: 
•  Transparency of Military Affairs; 
•  Deterrence of the United States and Japan; 
•  Sino-South Korean economic relations; and 
•  Diplomatic efforts. 
South Korea should only increase military power to just enough to 
maintain peace on the Korean peninsula.  South Korean military power should not be a 
threat to China.  Also, South Korea needs to ensure China that a unified Korea will not be 
a threat to China.  If China does not feel threatened by a unified Korea, Chinese attitudes 
toward the territory and history distortion problems will change and China will feel less 
necessity to intervene in a collapsed North Korea.  Also, United States Forces Korea 
(USFK) should be reduced so it would not be a threat to China in the unified Korea.  
China should not be threatened by USFK in unified Korea so USFK should be stationed  
 
 
                                                 






in the southern part of unified Korea.   Because USFK can serve a mediator role for 
increasing Japanese military influence on the Korean peninsula, a moderate-sized USFK 
should be fine for China. 
The United States will be the main deterrence for Chinese 
intervention in collapsed North Korea.  The deterrence can be conducted in two ways: 
military and economic.107 
In the Korean War, the United States military played a decisive 
role in deterring the Soviet Union’s military intervention.  Even though the United States 
military’s participation in the Korean War brought China’s intervention, the United States 
military played an important part in rescuing South Korea from invasion by North Korea.  
The main obstacle for China to intervene in a collapsed North Korea will be the United 
States Forces Korea (USFK).  But, the important point is that too many USFK troops 
may bring China’s intervention on the Korean peninsula, because China does not want 
the United States to have much influence in unified Korea.  Therefore, the number of 
USKF troops should be carefully considered so as not to stimulate China. 
The trade between the PRC and the United States has increased 
amazingly. Total bilateral trade between the two states has grown from 33 billion United 
States dollars to more than 230 billion the Unites States dollars in 2004.  Also, in 2006, 
the United States trade deficit with China exceeded 350 billion U.S. dollars and was the 
United States’ largest two-way trade deficit that year.108  China wants to be an 
economically strong state and China is mostly depending on the United States.  The 
United States can use this economic situation properly.  
South Korea also has been an important state for China’s economic 
development.  In 2006, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao said that trade with South Korea 
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would be 200 billion U.S. dollars.109  So if South Korea is able to convince China that 
unified Korea will not be a threat and give economic help to China, it will be helpful to 
deter China’s intervention in a collapsed North Korea. 
The South Korean government should learn from the diplomatic 
policy of West Germany’s previous Chancellor Helmut Kohl.  When the Soviet Union 
had economic difficulty in the late 1980s, it needed economic help from foreign states.  
The Kohl government did not lose this chance and received the Soviet Union’s trust 
through economic assistance.  Due to Kohl’s efforts, he could visit Moscow in 1988 and 
Mikhail Gorbachev visited Bonn in 1989.  And then, the West German government 
achieved a unified Germany without any foreign state’s intervention through diplomatic 
negotiation with the Soviet government, which opposed Germany unification.110  The 
South Korean government should persuade the Chinese government that a unified Korea 
will be beneficial to China. 
c. Japan 
Does Japan want Korea to be unified?   South and North Koreans think 
that Japan does not want Korea to be unified, because unified Korea can be a new threat 
to Japan.  The basis of this idea stems from the Korean people’s emotional hatred born of 
historical tragedies with Japan.  Japan has had an opportunistic posture toward Korean 
issues after the Korean War.  Japan’s “two Korea” policy shows that Japan wants to have 
economic trade with, and political influence on both Koreas.  Whether or not Korea is 
unified does not seriously matter to Japan.  However, Japan worries about the impact of a 
North Korean sudden collapse, dragging into a possible future Korean war, and 
expansion of unified Korea’s influence. 
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If North Korea suddenly collapses, there will be many refugees from 
North Korea going to Japan.  Also, Japan may share the economic burden with South 
Korea resulting from a sudden North Korean collapse.  Therefore, if North Korea 
collapses, a “soft landing” is better than a “hard landing” to Japan, so Japan will pursue a 
“soft landing” policy toward North Korea.  
Japan does not want to be involved in a possible future Korean war.  
Because of the Japan-U.S. military alliance, Japan may face involvement in the war even 
though Japan does not want to.   Even though Japan does not want involvement in the 
war, Japan could be a target of North Korean missiles because of the United States bases 
in Japan or due to a strategic attack by North Korea on Japan to encourage China to get 
involved in a Korean war.  Even though Japan had economic benefits during the Korean  
 
War, the benefits were offset by the costs Japan paid to help North Korea in the following 
years.  Therefore, a future possible war on the Korean peninsula would not be desirable 
to Japan. 
The last concern Japan may carry is a military alliance between a unified 
Korea and China to reduce Japanese power in Northeast Asia.111  Because Korea and 
China both have historical anti-Japanese emotions, Japan does not want a unified Korea 
and China to be military allies, and also, unified Korea and China do not want Japan to 
have much military influence in Northeast Asia.  China can use a unified Korea to offset 
the increasing influence of Japan in Northeast Asia.112  Because Korea has not been a 
military threat to China historically, if there is no increasing influence or threat of USFK 
(United States Forces Korea), China can use the card of Korean unification to control 
Japanese power. 
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Does Japan want both Koreas to be unified?  Harrison said in his book, 
Korean Endgame, that “many Japanese do foresee several ways in which a unified Korea 
could prove to be more dangerous for Japan in security terms than the status quo.”113 
Japan can be neither a positive factor nor a negative factor for Korean unification, but the 
South Korean government can use the relations between China and Japan. 
d. Russia 
The Russian government has announced that it supports Korean 
unification.  At the 1991 summit talks on Jeju Island, former Russian President, Mikhail 
Gorbachev, said that Russia supports Korean unification.114  Also, the next President, 
Vladimir Putin, said that Russia gives “full support for peaceful reunification of the 
Korean Peninsula.”115  Unlike Japan, unified Korea does not pose much threat to Russia.  
On the contrary, Russia can receive economic help from unified Korea.  Trade between 
South Korea and Russia has increased rapidly.  The amount of trade between the ROK 
and Russia was 15.06 billion U.S. dollars in 2007 and South Korean economic experts 
expect that Russia could be South Korea’s fourth largest export state.116  Also, Russia 
thinks unified Korea could be a help in relations with Japan.  Russian scholar Gennady 
Chufrin said, “If history is properly considered, a unified Korea would be close to us, 
which would improve our bargaining position against Japan,” and also said “of the 
involved powers – China, Japan, the United States, and Russia – Russia has the least to 
lose politically, militarily, or economically from unification.”117  Russian Diplomatic 
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Committee Parliamentarian Chopeu Cossa said “Unified Korea will be a very realistic 
‘balance’ to dealing with Japan and China in the process of development in Far Eastern 
Russia and East Siberia. That accorded with our interest. ”118  President Putin, who has 
the goal of a “strong state”, will participate in the process of Korean unification and has 
plans to increase Russian influence in Far East Asia. 
On the other hand, there are reasons for Russian opposition concerning 
unification of Korea.  Unification of Korea may bring an increase in Japanese military.  
Increasing Japan military will be a considerable threat to Russia. Also, if Russia thinks 
that a unified Korea will not be friendly to Russia, Russia will be an obstacle to a unified  
Korea.  USFK in a unified Korea can be a threat to Russia.  Therefore, the Korean 
government needs to make Russia think that a unified Korea will not be a threat and give 
economic benefits to Russia. 
2. Reducing Political Differences Between the Two Koreas 
a. Unification Policy of South and North Korea 
Both Korean unification policies are based on their constitutions. The 
South Korean constitution includes the concept that South Korea is the only legal state on 
the Korea peninsula.119 On the other hand, although there is no article concerning North 
Korean territory in the North Korean Constitution, Article 103 implies that North Korean 
territory is part of the Korean peninsula.120 South and North Korea both insist that their 
state is the only legal state on the Korean peninsula. The South and North Korean 
                                                 
118 SegyeIlbo, "Russia Supports Korean Unification-Link to Northeast Development," 
http://www.segye.com/Articles/News/International/Article.asp?aid=20060308000024&ctg1=01&ctg2=00
&subctg1=01&subctg2=00&cid=0101040100000&dataid= (accessed 04/23/2008).     
119 South Korean Constitution Article 4: “The Republic of Korea territory is the Korean peninsula and 
islands.” 





unification policies have been opposed, varied, and self-centered. Researching the two 
unification policies is important when we consider a unified Korea. 
(1)  South Korean Unification Policy.  South Korea’s unification 
policy has shown South Korea’s overall ability compared to that of North Korea.121  
When South Korean military and economic power was inferior in the 1950s and 1960s, 
the South Korean unification policy was passive and dependent. In the 1970s the South 
Korean unification policy started to adjust, but it was still a passive policy which only 
focused on settlement of peace on the Korean peninsula because of inferior military 
power. But from the 1980s the South Korean unification policy changed from passive to 
active because South Korean military and economic power has overwhelmed that of 
North Korea.  
The unification policy of the First Republic of South Korea, Rhee 
Syngman’s administration, was both accomplishing unification through general election 
in North Korea under the United Nations’ supervision and unification through military 
power. Rhee Syngman tried to unify the Koreas during the Korean War but failed 
because of China’s military intervention. 
Rhee’s regime was changed by the “4·19 Revolution,” and the 
Second Republic of South Korea was started by the “7·29 General Election.” This was 
the first and the only time South Korea had a cabinet system instead of a presidential 
system.  Yun Po Sun was elected President, but he had only a nominal role.  Therefore, 
the prime minister and head of government was Chang Myon.  Chang Myon’s 
government abandoned the unification by military power and he thought South Korea 
needed to have economic power before having unification.122  The Second Republic of 
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South Korea’s unification policy was having a general election both in South and North 




Table 4.   Comparison of South and North Korea’s unification policies 
Source: (After Kim 2006, 49-67) 
Time South Korea Time North Korea 
[1948 – 1960] 
 
The 1st Republic 
(Rhee Syngman)  
general election in North Korea under 
United Nations’ supervision, military 
power. 
[1948 –  
1960] 
secret voting of South and 
North Korea after 
withdrawal of foreign 
military in Korea 
peninsula 
[1960 – 1962] 
 
The 2nd Republic 
(Chang Myong)  
general election both in South and North 
Korea under United Nations’ 
supervision. 
“Precedence Economic Construction, 
Afterward Unification.” 
[1963 – 1972] 
The 3rd Republic 
(Park Chung-hee) 
“Precedence Construction, Afterward 
Unification.”(1960) 
“Three Basic Principles of Peaceful 
Reunification,” 
“Precedence Peace, Afterward 
Unification.”(1974) 




[1972 – 1981] 








“Federal Republic of 
Korea” 
[1981 – 1988] 
The 5th Republic 
(Chun Doo-hwan) 
“National Unity Democratic 
Unification,”  “Provisional Agreement 
on the Relationship between the Two 
Koreas Base” (1982) 
[1980s] “Korea Democratic 
Federal Republic’ 
[1990s] “Loose Federal 
Unification” 
[1988 – 2000s] 
The 6th Republic 
(Roh Tea-woo) 
“Special Presidential Declaration for 
Ethnic Pride and Unified Prosperity” 
(1988) 
“Korean Community Unification”(1989) 
(Kim Young-sam) 
“Ethnic Communities Unification”(1994) 
(Kim Dae-jung) 
“Federation Republic” (1987) 
“Three Steps Unification Theory” (1991) 
“June 15th South-North Joint 
Declaration”(2000) 
(Roh Moo-hyun) 
“Policy for Peace and Prosperity”(2003) 








The difference between the Second Republic of South Korea’s unification policy 
and the first one was having a general election not only in North Korea, but also in South 
Korea. 
The unification policy of having a general election both in South 
and North Korea continued in the Third Republic of South Korea. After Park Chung-hee 
grasped political power through a military coup, he focused on capacity improvement for 
unification with the slogan: “seongeonseol hutongil.”(‘First Construction, Then 
Unification) In the 1970s, because of international détente and the South and North talks, 
the “7·4 Inter-Korean Joint Statement,” the unification plan was solidified. President Park 
announced his “Three Basic Principles for Peaceful Reunification.” It says (1) we should 
have peace on the Korean peninsula. For this to happen, the South and the North should 
conclude an inter-inviolability treaty; (2) the South and the North should open the doors 
and recover trust.  For this to be possible, multiple interchanges and cooperation are 
necessary; (3) based on these factors, South and North Korea should complete unification 
through free general election.123   These principles represented the “seonpyeonghwa, 
hutongil” (‘First Peace, Then Unification’) policy of the Third Republic of South Korea. 
According to these principles, the general election did not mean an election under the 
United Nations’ supervision.124  
The Fourth Republic of South Korea collapsed with the 
assassination of President Park and the Fifth Republic of South Korea started with 
President Chun Doo-hwan. Chun’s administration proposed “National Unity Democratic 
Unification.”  The content of this plan was as follows: (1) creating a “National 
Unification Council” with South-North representatives; (2) preparing a unified 
constitution pursuing ideology of people, democracy, freedom, and welfare; (3) 
confirmation and promulgation of a unified constitution through South-North free 
national voting; (4) having a general election through the unified constitution and 
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creating a unified National Assembly and government.125  Additionally, he suggested 
agreeing on the following seven clauses of “Provisional Agreement on the Relationship 
between the Two Koreas”: (1) maintaining inter-relations based on the principles of 
equality and mutual benefit; (2) resolving inter-troubles not by force and violence but 
through conversation; (3) recognition of the different political and social affairs, 
nonintervention; (4) maintaining armistice and eliminating a state of confrontation arms 
race; (5) promoting mutual exchanges and cooperation through mutual openness; (6) 
respecting international treaties and agreements of the nation; (7) installing resident 
contacted representatives in Seoul and Pyongyang.126  
Roh Tae-woo’s administration, the Sixth Republic of South Korea, 
announced the “Special Presidential Declaration for Ethnic Pride and Unified Prosperity” 
on July 7, 1988. The content of this declaration is as follows: (1) free national and 
international travel for the two Koreas to open doors, (2) active support of written 
correspondence, living/deceased verification, and address verification prior to meetings 
of separated family members, (3) opening the doors for inter-Korean trade and 
considering such trade as domestic trade , (4) no opposition toward North Korea’s non-
military related trade with South Korea’s allied countries (5) North Korea to improve 
relations with South Korean allies, including the United States and Japan, and South 
Korea to improve relations with socialist countries.127  This was an active declaration to 
urge North Korea’s behavior against South Korea according to détente period.  The Roh 
administration also announced the “Korean Community Unification” on September 11, 
1989. This plan followed the “Special Presidential Declaration for Ethnic Pride and 
Unified Prosperity.”  This plan had three steps of unification: (1) Adapting an ethnic 
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community charter through South and North summit meetings; (2) Passing through the 
Korean Commonwealth; and (3) Establishing the Democratic Republic of Unified Korea 
prepared by the Constitution from the council of the inter-Korean reunification based on 
the unified government in a general election.128  This unification plan complemented the 
existing unification plans which had not enough middle process of unification and 
proposed “The Korean Commonwealth” as a transition system toward a unified Korea. 
South and North Korea are sovereign states in “The Korean Commonwealth” but the 
relations are not international relations, but special relations based on domestic law. 
Therefore, “The Korean Commonwealth” is different from “Confederation” and 
“Federation.”  “The Korean Commonwealth’ does not mean ‘One People, Two States’ 
but ‘Two systems for one People.”129  This unification plan maintained South Korea’s 
long-term unification policy which had processed as follows: (1) conformation and 
promulgation unification constitution through democratic way and process; (2) having a 
general election by the unified constitution; (3) completing the creation of a unified 
Korea.  
Kim Young-sam’s administration announced “Ethnic 
Communities’ Unification.” (The full name is ‘Korean unification community for the 
construction of Phase 3.’) This plan had a three-step process unification plan: (1) 
Cooperation and reconciliation; (2) two Koreas union; (3) national unification 
completion. This plan was somewhat similar to Roh’s unification plan. 
Kim Dae-jung proposed a “Federation Republic” on August 15, 
1987.  This plan was based on the three Codes of Conduct: peaceful coexistence, peaceful 
exchange, and peaceful reunification.  Also, Kim Dae-jung announced the “Three Steps 
Unification Theory”: (1) 1 union, 1 people, 2 states, 2 systems, 2 independent 
governments (2) 1 federation, 1 people, 1 state, 1 system, 2 local governments (3) 1 
people, 1 state, 1 system, 1 central government.  
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The historical inter-Korean summit talks were held from June 13 – 
15, 2000.  At this meeting, the two summits made the “June 15th South-North Joint 
Declaration.”  This declaration includes agreements between South and North Korea.  
These agreements include:130 
•  The North and the South agreed to solve the question of the country’s 
reunification independently by the concerted efforts of the Korean nation 
responsible for it; 
•  The North and the South, recognizing that the low-level federation proposed 
by the North and the commonwealth system proposed by the South for the 
reunification of the country have similarities, and agreed to work together 
for the reunification in this direction in the future; 
•  The North and the South agreed to settle humanitarian issues as early as 
possible, including the exchange of visiting groups of separated families and 
relatives and the issue of unconverted long-term prisoners, to mark August 
15, this year; 
•  The North and the South agreed to promote the balanced development of the 
national economy through economic cooperation and build mutual 
confidence by activating cooperation and exchange in all fields, social, 
cultural, sports, public health, environmental and so on;  
•  The North and the South agreed to hold an authority-to-authority 
negotiation as soon as possible to put the above-mentioned agreed points 
into speedy operation. 
(2)  North Korean Unification Policy.  North Korea’s unification 
policy also has changed as North Korea’s ability lessened compared to that of South 
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Korea.  In the 50s, 60s, and 70s, North Korea’s unification policy was active because its 
military and economic power was superior to South Korea’s.  South Korea’s military and 
economic ability has been superior to North Korea since 1980, so North Korea’s 
unification policy has changed to a passive policy.131 
At the second “buk ro” party convention in 1948, Kim Il Sung 
proposed unification by secret voting of South and North Korea after the withdrawal of 
foreign military on the Korean peninsula.  After that North Korea organized “the 
Democratic Front for the Reunification of the Fatherland” which undertook a unification 
campaign in North Korea in June 1949.  North Korea tried to unify the Korean peninsula 
by war in 1950, but they failed.  After the Korean War, North Korea proposed unification 
by South and North Korean general election under supervision of a neutral state at the 
Geneva conference in 1954.132 
In the 1960s, Kim Il Sung’s regime was settled and North Korea’s 
military ability was superior to South Korean ability so North Korean actions toward 
unification was very scrappy.  The North Korean unification policy was stimulated by 
Park’s anticommunism policy, so North Korean military power provocations were 
increased.133 
North Korea suggested an “Inter-Korean Federation” for the first 
time in August 1960.  There were matters to be attended to in the suggestion.  First, it 
was the first suggestion of a federation.  Second, the general election for establishing an 
“Inter-Korean Federation” had the condition of the withdrawal of foreign military in 
South Korea.  Third, an “Inter-Korean Federation” was selected not as the only way to 
unification, but as one of the ways to unification.  Fourth, an “Inter-Korean Federation” 
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was closer to a confederation than a federation because of maintaining South and North 
Korean systems.134  North Korea’s “Inter-Korean Federation” was rejected by South 
Korean Chang Myon’s government.  Because of the government’s rejection of the North 
Korean proposal, there was opposition.  So North Korea proposed the “Inter-Korean 
Federation” again and the organizing of a “Committee of Fatherland Peaceful 
Unification” in 1961, but North Korea stopped the proposal because of Park’s new 
government, which had strong anticommunism sentiments.  But North Korea’s ulterior 
motive to make South Korea a communist state with the “Inter-Korean Federation” was 
revealed in “Strengthening Three Revolution Capacities,” which has been the basis of the 
North Korean unification policy.  The three revolution capacities consisted of North 
Korea’s revolution capacity, South Korea’s revolution capacity, and international 
revolution capacity.  The first and third revolution capacities somewhat succeeded, but 
the second revolution capacity failed.  North Korea also emphasized that “Strengthening 
Three Revolution Capacities” was the unification plan of North Korea in the 1960s. 
South and North Korea’s relations had changed from the 1970s 
because of the international détente atmosphere.  North Korea proposed federation 
unification again in 1970s and suggested a “Federal Republic of Korea” with the 
“Fatherland Unification Five Policies.”  The five policies were an easing of strained 
relations between South and North Korea, actualization of various cooperation and 
interchange between South and North Korea, convocation of national meetings consisting 
of citizens, and representatives of parties and social organizations, establishing an inter-
Korean federation by the name of the Federal Republic of Korea, and joining the United 
Nations with the name the “Federal Republic of Korea.”  Both federations of the 1960s 
and the 1970s are transitional period unification of Korea. 
In October 1980, North Korea proposed a “Korea Democratic 
Federal Republic.” The special features of the “Korea Democratic Federal Republic” are 
as follow: First, the “Korea Democratic Federal Republic” is not a transient unification of 
                                                 




Korea, but final unification of Korea. Second, this has two local governments, a 
sovereign state, and a neutral state. Third, North Korea abandoned general election. 
Fourth, North Korea suggested establishing national allied forces, which consisted of 
reduced South and North military. 
Kim Il Sung proposed a “Unification by Federal System Based on 
One People, One State, Two Systems, and Two Governments.”  Also, he said that South 
Korea’s “One state, One system” might bring a split of unified Korea, therefore easing 
into one system in the next generation. In other words, he wanted South and North 
Korean governments to have diplomatic and military authority: “Loose Federal 
Unification.”135 This meant North Korea did not want the unification type of unified 
Germany.136 
Until 2000, North Korea had claimed “First Unification, Later 
Cooperation” without consideration of a middle-step of unification. Therefore, there had 
been no meaningful interchange and cooperation.  But, after North Korea proposed a 
“Low-level Federation” in the first summit meeting and changed to “First Cooperation, 
Later Unification,” South-North economic cooperation was propelled.  The “Low-level 
Federation” was proposed in the South and North summit meeting.  This policy was 
based on the principle of one people, two states, two systems, and two governments. 
According to this policy, the South and North have individual governments and each 
government has political, military, and diplomatic rights.137  North Korean steps of 
unification are: first, unitary states of South and North Korea; second, low level 
federation Korea; and lastly, federation Korea.  On the contrary, South Korean steps of 
unification are: first, unitary states of South and North Korea; second, confederation 
Korea; and lastly, the unitary state Korea. 
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b. North Korean Policies 
(1)  Reform of North Korea.  After the Cold War, assistance from 
the Soviet Union and China ceased and made the North Korean economic situation 
worse.  Kim Jong Il asked for economic aid from Russia and Japan, but was denied.138  
North Korea could not recover the close relationship with Russia like the close 
relationship it had with the Soviet Union.  Also, North Korea had a kidnapping problem 
with Japan so the Kim Jong Il –Koizumi summit failed. A food shortage resulting from 
the bad economic situation facilitated private farmers markets in North Korea and the 
need for reform started to increase.  In this situation, Kim Jong Il had to choose one of 
two options: forbidding private farmers markets by force, or reforming the economic 
systems.  He chose the latter option.139  On the other hand, his choice was not welcomed 
by the Workers Party and hard-liners, and his regime was not strong enough compared to 
his father’s regime to push his choice.  Therefore, his reform policy was called “reform 
by stealth.”  Despite hard-liners’ opposition, he had a few successes in reforming the 
economy with reformer’s support such as with the Sinuiju investment area. Reformers 
and hard-liners had conflicted during the reform process, and it was one of the bigger 
obstacles to the reform policy.  Also, the nuclear program was another obstacle to the 
reform policy.  North Korea’s nuclear program kept foreign investors from investing in 
and cooperating with North Korea.  Also, the North Korea nuclear program brought 
financial sanctions and a cease in assistance.  Bradley Babson, an East Asian specialist 
who worked twenty-six years for the World Ban, assessed North Korea reforms as “not 
sufficient to assure a turnaround in North Korea’s economic crisis and even add new 
risks, particularly the risk of inflation. To achieve sustainable economic growth, North 
Korea will need more policy reform towards a market economy.” 
(2)  “Seongun Policy” The Rodong Sinmun, a North Korean 
newspaper, said in an editorial that “The Great Kim Jong Il’s Seongun Policy brightens 
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the road of the fight for independence and socialism is our era’s revolutionary leading 
indicator”140  This editorial showed that Kim Jong Il’s policy has shifted from economic 
reform to the “Seongun Policy.”141  The “Seongun Policy” (military-first policy) began in 
1995, the year after Kim Il Sung’ death and became the major ideology of the regime and 
“Juche.”  “Seongun Policy” “calls for giving priority to military issues over everything 
and it is a strategy and tactics of putting the army before the working class.”142  There are 
a few reasons why Kim Jong Il has had the “Seongun Policy.” 
These reasons include: 
• Kim Jong Il’s concern the North Korean military will be a threat to his 
regime;143 
• Collapse of the Soviet Union, China and South Korea’s improved 
relations, and the United States’ centered unipolarity in international 
relations;  
• A weak military alliance among Russia, China, and North Korea; and 
• Military tension between North Korea and the United States. 
There was dissatisfaction among the military leaders when Kim 
Jong Il was decided on as the successor of Kim Il Sung. Therefore, the “Seongun Policy” 
can be considered a compromise between Kim Jong Il and the military leaders.  Also, the 
“Seongun Policy” made it possible for the military to become Kim Jong Il’s power base.  
Kim Jong Il felt the need of self-dependence when the Soviet 
Union collapsed, and Sino-South Korea relations improved. Therefore, he needed strong 
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military power.  Also, Kim Jong Il emphasized the importance of military power to fight 
against the United States’ imperialism. 
North Korea always worried about a United States surprise attack 
against North Korea to change the Kim Jong Il regime.  ROK-U.S.’s joint military drills 
have been big threats to North Korea, and finally, North Korea holds nuclear weapons to 
resist the United States threats. 
(3)  “Brinkmanship” with Nuclear Weapons.  The reasons why 
North Korea wants to have nuclear weapon are almost the same as the reasons for having 
the “Seongun Policy.”  While the “Seongun Policy” is to secure Kim’s regime from an 
inside threat, nuclear weapons are to secure his regime from outside threats.  The 
ambition of holding nuclear weapons came from Kim Il Sung.  Kim Il Sung learned the 
effect of nuclear brinkmanship from Truman and Eisenhower.  Nuclear weapons were 
used as their bargaining chip during the Korean War and to force an armistice.144  
Therefore, Kim stated a nuclear weapons program as soon as the Korean War ended.  
After the Korean War, an increasing ROK-U.S. military threat to North Korea facilitated 
Kim Il Sung’s will to hold nuclear weapons.  
Finally, North Korea holds nuclear weapons.  Guessing the number 
of nuclear weapons is varied according to analysts, but they are assured that North Korea 
holds nuclear weapons.  Kim Jong Il has more confidence in diplomatic negotiations and 
is feeling less threat from the United States military.  Kim Jong Il needs to choose 
between abandoning and holding nuclear weapons.  His choice is very important to the 
future security of the Korean peninsula.  Even if the United States government has 
changed to an engagement policy, the United States’ next government will not accept 
North Korean nuclear weapons.  If Kim Jong Il chooses to abandon nuclear weapons, 
North Korea can have economic assistance and it will be very helpful to alleviate North 
Korea’s recent economic crisis.  On the contrary, if Kim Jong Il chooses to hold nuclear 
                                                 




weapons and use them as a brinkmanship, the Korean peninsula security situation will 
become more complicated. 
B. MILITARY AREA 
 
Figure 6.   Military Area 
 
1. Negative Factors 
a. U.S.-DPRK Military Conflict 
The United States created “OPLAN 5026” to prepare for the North Korean 
nuclear crisis in 1993.145  This plan includes a precise attack on North Korean nuclear 
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facilities.  Because this plan would be conducted not by ROK-U.S. CFC (Combined 
Forces Command), but by PACOM (Pacific Command), the United States could attack 
North Korea without South Korea.  After 9/11, there is a greater possibility that the 
United States would have a military operation in North Korea without the approval of the 
United Nations in the name of “the right to self-defense,” such as in Afghan and Iraq war. 
Also, North Korea has been known to have many “Weapons of Mass Destruction,” so 
there is a greater possibility that the United States would use the “right to self-defense” 
despite opposition from China and Russia.  The United States military strategy against 
North Korea has changed since 1998.146 “OPLAN 5027 – 98” has been changed from a 
defensive plan to an offensive plan against North Korea. Marine Lt. Gen. Raymond P. 
Ayres said: “When we are done, they will not be able to mount any military activity of 
any kind. We will kill them all.”147  He also said the goal of this plan was to “abolish 
North Korea as a functioning state, end the rule of its leader, Kim Jong Il, and reorganize 
the country under South Korean control.” Also, “OPLAN 5027 – 02” includes a military 
force calculation which is needed to remove North Korean leader Kim Jong Il.148  
“OPLAN 5030” was made in late May 2003 at Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s 
indication and revealed on July 21, 2003. In this plan, United States Forces would 
conduct frequent military maneuvers to force North Korea to use their resources and 
finally force North Korea into collapse.  
The United States may attack North Korea by ‘misunderstanding and 
inadvertence.’149  A case of war caused by misunderstanding by the United States can be 
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found in the Korean War.  The United States military pulled back from South Korea in 
June 1949 and then North Korea invaded South Korea within one year.  Why did they 
retreat from South Korea?  The United States may have incorrectly calculated the 
strategic value of the Korean peninsula and the benefit for the United States from its 
retreat.  They also may have underestimated the strong will of the Soviet Union and 
North Korea to have war.  Former Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, made a speech 
about the United States’ security strategy in the Pacific.  In the speech, he said that the 
United States will guarantee the security of the countries which are inside of the Acheson 
line: the Aleutians – Japan – Philippines.  He also said that the United States cannot 
guarantee the security of the countries which are outside of the line and that these 
countries need to firstly protect themselves and secondly depend on the United Nations. 
Misconceptions of the United States brought misconceptions of North Korea.  North 
Korea thought the United States would not join in the Korean civil war.150  Another 
misconception is that the United States may lead to another war on the Korean 
peninsula.151  
Even though the United States made operation plans to attack North Korea 
and there is a possibility of a North Korean attack by misconception of the United States, 
it is controversial to say that United States will attack North Korea.  Because the United 
States’ policy has been changed from an oppressive policy (neo-conservatism policy) to 
an engagement policy (realism policy) and South Korea and China will not agree with the 
United States’ attack on North Korea, the possibility of a United States attack has been 
reduced.  Also, since North Korea became a limited nuclear power state, it is more 
difficult for the United States to attack North Korea.  Pakistan’s nuclear weapon is a good 
example.  After Pakistan succeeded in nuclear testing, it has shown more bellicosity 
against India.  Even though Pakistan is a weaker state than India, India cannot easily 
initiate a military response due to the concern of a nuclear war.  This situation can be 
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called “limited war.”  “Limited war” means that even though a weaker state which has a 
nuclear weapon commits a military attack on a stronger state, the stronger state can have 
only a limited military response because of the fear of nuclear war.152 
2. Positive Factors 
a. ROK-U.S. Military Alliance 
Diplomatic relations between Korea and the United States were initiated in 
1883 by Lucius Harwood Foote, the first diplomatic minister of the United States who 
was sent to Korea. The United States government had two policies toward Korea which 
Foote came for. One was independence of Korea and the other was extension of trade 
rights to American citizens. When he arrived in Korea, the king of Korea danced with joy 
because of his expectation of freedom from the Qing Dynasty. 
But United States – Korea relations have been changed since the Korean 
War.  One opinion of South and North Koreans is that the United States is the ringleader 
of divided Korea.  This dissatisfaction is related to the idea that the United States wanted 
to retain a divided Korea because of strategic purposes concerning Japan during the Cold 
War.  Also, this dissatisfaction comes from a disagreement with United States’ foreign 
policy, especially toward North Korea, anger against certain American actions, and some 
South Koreans’ complaints about United States military presence. The Katsura-Taft 
Agreement153 gives one reason why some Koreans think that the United States views 
Korea as an auxiliary means for relations between the United States and Japan.  Kim Jong 
Pil, who served as Prime minister of South Korea, said that “American self-interest and 
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convenience dictated our twin national disaster, the thirty-eighth parallel and the 1953 
armistice line.”  This young generation’s dissatisfaction is more than the grateful feeling 
which the older generation has because of the United States’ military participation during 
the Korean War.  Actually, sixty percent of university students answered that the United 
States hinders Korean unification154. 
The George W. Bush administration’s policy toward North Korea and the 
Kim Dae-jung administration’s “Sunshine Policy” created relational friction between the 
United States and South Korea.155  The Bush administration’s tough policy toward North 
Korea conflicted with Kim Dae-jung’s soft policy. This friction even worsened because 
of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.  Also, the next administration of South Korea, the Roh Moo-
hyun administration, had frequent discord with the Bush administration because of the 
dispatch of Korean troops to Iraq, the strategic idea of South Korea’s balancing role in 
Northeast Asia, and the future transfer of wartime control to South Korea.  Even though 
the United States and South Korea are allied states, there has been tension between them.  
Glenn Snyder explains this situation as a “security dilemma of an alliance.”156  Glenn 
Snyder said in the “security dilemma of an alliance” that allied states can increase 
security because of military cooperation, but they need to sacrifice their autonomy of 
policy because of alliance. There is trade-off between security and autonomy in the 
relations of alliance.  
After George W. Bush became the president of the United States, the 
United States propelled the Global Posture Review (GPR).  The GPR is the Pentagon’s 
new military strategy to realign its overseas presence in what it sees as a more efficient, 
                                                 
154 Gea Chang Cho, "University Students 60% "U.S. Hinders Unification"," Segye Ilbo, 
http://www.segye.com/Articles/NEWS/SOCIETY/Article.asp?aid=20041123000593&subctg1=&subctg2=
&DataID=200411231155001697 (accessed 07/14/2008).     
155 Edward A. Olsen, Korea, the Divided Nation (Westport, Conn: Praeger Security International, 
2005), 134.     
156 Hyun Kim, "An Analysis of the Roh Administration's Conflicts with the U.S." Social Theory 31, 




flexible and suitable defense system to fit the needs of the 21st century.157  To carry out 
this new plan the United States needs to have “Strategic Flexibility” so the United States 
can quickly send the United States military stationed overseas to the places they want.  
Also the United States is planning to form a “Northeast Asia Command” in order to 
defend the Northeast Asian region, including such areas as the Korean Peninsula, the 
Taiwanese Strait, and Japan.158  
South Korea and the United States have been allied for more than half a 
century.  The alliance has had a new need to be evolved and adapted after the post-Cold 
War era.  The change of national security and global strategy of the United States, change 
of domestic situation of South Korea, security change in Northeast Asia, and new 
administrations in the United States and South Korea need a redefined South Korea-U.S. 
alliance.  Strategic change of a South Korea-U.S. alliance will be an important changing 
point in dealing with North Korea problems.  Even if there has been discord between 
South Korea and the United States, the relations of the two states will be recovered and 
need to be progressed.  On the day of his presidential inauguration, the new president of 
South Korea, Lee Myung Bak, said, “We will work to develop and further strengthen 
traditional friendly relations with the United States into a future-oriented partnership 
based on the deep mutual trust that exists between the two peoples, we will also 
strengthen our strategic alliance with the United States.”  The expectation of better 
relations between the two states has grown. 
South Korea and the United States have been working together for more 
than a half century.  The alliance of the two states has been an important factor in 
maintaining peace on the Korean peninsula.  To have successful state succession from the 
collapse of North Korea, strengthening the alliance of South Korea and the United States 
is necessary.  As I mentioned earlier, only in the case of North Korea’s request to hand 
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over its sovereignty to South Korea can South Korea absorb North Korea without other 
states’ intervention.  If North Korea collapses not by South Korean forces, but by another 
state’s forces, and if South Korea cannot have leadership in an abruptly collapsed North 
Korea, South Korea will have difficulties to unify North Korea the way South Korea 
wants.  Because the possibility of North Korea’s handing over its sovereignty to South 
Korea is low, South Korea needs to strengthen international cooperation, especially with 
the United States.  Also, even if North Korea is collapsed, the alliance of the ROK-U.S. 
will still be needed.  There are many Korean peninsula security issues which make the 
ROK-U.S. alliance necessary, such as disputes of territory and resources, and increasing 
complexity of balance of power between Japan and China.  The United States also needs 
the ROK-U.S. alliance for the United States’ new Northeast Asia strategy, which needs 
each ally’s contributions and burden-sharing. 
As I mentioned in Chapter II, a redefined ROK-U.S. alliance is needed. 
The new alliance should focus on the following.159  First, the alliance should be 
transferred from just a military alliance to “a comprehensive security alliance.”  “A 
comprehensive security alliance” is not just a military alliance, but also a security alliance 
dealing with comprehensive dimension such as economic, social, and political 
dimensions.  Second, the alliance should not just focus on regional affairs but focus on all 
kinds of possible threats such as terrorism, nuclear weapons, and deterrence of mass 
destruction weapons proliferation.  Third, the alliance should not just take a reactive 
approach to threats but take a proactive preventive approach that responds to threats 
effectively. 
b. Intervention of South Korean Military 
If North Korea collapses, can the South Korean military intervene alone? 
This is an important question, because many South Koreans think that if North Korea 
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collapses, North Korea will automatically be part of South Korea. To make a collapsed 
North Korea be a part of Unified Korea, the South Korean military needs to get into 
collapsed North Korea and complete at least four missions160: military operations, civil 
affairs operations, disarmament of North Korea’s military, and disarmament of North 
Korea’s weapons of mass destruction.  But the possibility of the South Korean 
government’s solo intervention is not high.  As I mentioned in Chapter I, South and 
North Korea do not recognize each other as a state, even if both Korean constitutions 
declare that their own country is a state.  International society thinks of South and North 
Korea as separate states because South and North Korea joined the United Nations 
separately.  Also, “OPLAN 5027” includes ROK-U.S. CFC (Combined Forces 
Command)’s operations preparing for a North Korean collapse, so it will be difficult for 
the South Korean military to have operations in collapsed North Korea alone.  Even 
though the South Korean government takes back “wartime operation control” in 2012,161  
it is very doubtful that the South Korean government can facilitate military operations in 
a collapsed North Korea alone, because South Korea does not have appropriate operation 
plans for such a situation.  Even though there is a low possibility of the Korean 
government’s solo military intervention, there are some cases the South Korean 
government can intervene alone.162  If the North Korean government asks the South 
Korean government to intervene during the process of a North Korean collapse, the South 
Korean government can intervene alone.  Operation plans between South Korea and the 
United States can be a problem, but the South Korean government can insist on South 
Korea’s solo intervention because the situation is not a wartime situation.  Another 
situation is if North Korea gives up its government and merges into South Korea.  Then, 
South Korea could have operations in a collapsed North Korea alone.  
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These cases are low possibilities, but the South Korean government needs 
to prepare for all possible cases.  The South Korean government needs to prepare 
operation plans for all possible cases and should not just depend on the operational plans 
prepared by ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command. 
c. Readiness of Korean Military 
 Before the South Korean government confronts a possible North 
Korean collapse, the South Korean military should be prepared in military and civil 
affairs operation areas.   The lists of preparation are as follow: 
•  Military operations 
→  Disarmament of North Korean military 
→  Controlling WMD and nuclear weapons 
•  Civil affairs operation 
→  Maintaining public security 
→  Helping refugees 
→  Settlement of public administration 
The South Korean government needs to prepare for disarmament operations in North 
Korea.  The North Korean army “remains one of the largest standing armies in Asia, after 
China and Indonesia, and the fifth largest in the world, approximately one million 
personnel (the world’s third largest ground force) organized into 32 active infantry 
divisions; 40,000 – 60,000 in the navy, which has submarines and patrol craft; and an 
estimated 70,000 – 92,000 in the air force, which also provides anti-aircraft defense.  The 
army has approximately 5,000 tanks, 2,000 armored personnel carriers, 2,400 multiple 




100,000 personnel who are designated as Special Forces and some 115,000 paramilitary 
forces under the Ministry of Public Security (MPS). 163  The South Korean military needs 
to plan ahead to determine how they will utilize the huge number of North Korean 
military personnel and out-of-date North Korean weapons.  North Korean military 
personnel can be used as industry personnel, and some out-of-date North Korean 
weapons should be disposed of or could be used in industrial fields. 
There is no doubt that North Korea has WMD (Weapons of Mass 
Destruction) and North Korea insists that does.  As the Iraq War has shown, the United 
States will act aggressively concerning North Korean WMD and nuclear weapons.  If 
North Korea collapses, the first thing the United States will do in North Korea is find and 
destroy WMD.  What is more, the United States may not let any other state join in 
finding and destroying WMD of North Korea.  But, South Korea should be prepared for 
finding and destroying WMD in case an independent South Korean military operation is 
required in a collapsed North Korea. 
Civil Affairs Operations (CAO) means “those military operations planned, 
supported, executed, or transitioned by Civil Affairs forces through, with, or by the 
indigenous population and institutions, intergovernmental organizations, 
nongovernmental organizations, or other governmental agencies to modify behaviors, to 
mitigate or defeat threats to civil society, and to assist in establishing the capacity for 
deterring or defeating future civil threats in support of civil-military operations or other 
United States’ objectives.”164  Can South Korea have Civil Affairs Operations in 
collapsed North Korea?  As long as the United States has Wartime Operational Control, it 
will be difficult for the South Korean government to have CAO in a collapsed North 
Korea.  After getting back the Wartime Operational Control from the United States, the 
South Korean government will have a greater possibility of having CAO, but it also 
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depends on the type of military intervention in collapsed North Korea.  However, South 
Korea can develop reasons why South Korea needs to have a CAO in collapsed North 
Korea.  The reasons can be as follows: the South Korean military had successful CAO in 
Iraq, and the United States’ CAO was not successful in post-Korean War South Korea.  
North Korea has had sensitive responses concerning South Korean 
military dispatch in Iraq because North Korea thinks that the South Korean military is 
exercising CAO to prepare for a North Korean collapse.165  Actually, the experience of 
CAO in Iraq will be very helpful to the South Korean military to having a CAO in 
collapsed North Korea and also, it will be a good reason why the South Korean military 
should have a CAO in a collapsed North Korea.  Another reason is the unsuccessful 
operation of the United States military’s CAO in post-Korean War South Korea.  The 
United States did not understand South Korean’s nationalism.  For its convenience, the 
United States let Japanese officials do administration work in Korea after ending the 
Japanese colonial period.166  As a result, the United States military could not receive 
support from Korea so its CAO was not successful.  Koreans’ nationalism has not 
changed; therefore there is reason why the South Korean government should have a CAO 
in collapsed North Korea. 
How should the South Korean government prepare for a CAO in a 
collapsed North Korea?  The South Korean government should prepare for CAO in three 
areas: maintaining public security, helping refugees, and settlement of public 
administration.  
Maintaining public security will be the main duty for the South Korean 
military while it conducting a CAO in a collapsed North Korea.  To maintain public 
security, the South Korean military should prevent North Koreans from taking revenge 
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on pro-communists.  After ending the Japanese colony, there was much revenge-taking, 
killing pro-Japanese Koreans.  Also, after the Korean War, there was much killing of pro-
communists or pro-democrats on each side of Korea.  There can also be the same tragedy 
after the collapse of North Korea.  Additionally, there will be many refugees.  Refugees 
can make international problems; therefore, the South Korean government should prepare 
for dealing with North Korean refugees.  Dealing with refugees should not be finished by 
simply giving them shelter.  They should be settled, educated, and employed to maintain 
their livelihood.  Finally, the South Korean government needs to settle public 
administration as soon as possible.  To settle public administration quickly in a collapsed 
North Korea, public administration settlement specialists should be trained before a North 
Korean collapse.  The South Korean government can designate specialists to each area of 
North Korea so they can be trained more efficiently.  Also, North Korean data should be 
used in South Korean administration systems.  For that, standardization of data should be 
completed.  Additionally, cooperation among South Korean organizations is necessary.  
If they are selfish about sharing the information, settlement of public administration will 




C. SOCIAL/ECONOMIC AREA 
 
 
Figure 7.   Social Area 
a. The Costs of Unification 
Last year’s survey showed that 51.2% of South Koreans agreed to pay the 
costs of unification and 42.6% of South Koreans disagreed.  Three previous years of 
surveys of positive answers about paying the costs was 73.9% (2005) →78.3% (2006) 
→51.2% (2007), so the negative answer is growing.  Also, about the question regarding 
whether economic support to North Korea is “cost of unification” or “meaningless waste 
of money,”  “cost of unification” was 46.5% and “meaningless waste of money” was 
48.5%.   Three previous years of surveys of negative answers about the question was 
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54.2% (2005) → 64.5% (2006) → 48.6% (2007) so negative answers have been superior 
to positive answers.167  Because of economic decline in South Korea, South Koreans are 
not willing to pay the costs of unification.  If North Korea suddenly collapses, the cost 
will be higher than a gradual process, and then South Koreans may not agree with a 
costly unification.  South Koreans already saw the case of German unification.  When 
West Germany absorbed East Germany, the cost was much higher than expected.168  
South Korea estimated the cost of unification resulting from a North Korean collapse.  
The estimate was more than 2 trillion dollars, but if the economic gap is deeper, the cost 
will be more than that.169   
The South Korean government has confronted two problems concerning 
the costs of unification.  First, the South Korean government needs to gain South 
Koreans’ the people’s consent to paying the costs of unification, and secondly, the South 
Korean government should make an effort to reduce the costs of unification.  To gain 
South Korean consent, the costs of maintaining division versus unification should be 
compared.  An official of the Ministry of Unification, Hong Sung Kook said “The more 
time that passes, the more the costs of maintaining division will be increased.”  Also, a 
professor of Yonsei University, Jung Gap Young said that the costs of maintaining 
division were 5.95% of Korean GDP in 1995.170  The costs must be more in 2008 than 
the costs of 1995.  As unification is delayed, the economic burden to the South Koreans is 
increasing.  Therefore, the South Korean government can require the people’s consent.  
As Kim Dae Jung said in an interview in 200, the costs of unification are one of the big 
obstacles of unification.  He said “unification is only a matter of time. But for now, there 
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are more negatives than positives because we are currently not capable of economically 
supporting North Korea.”171  To reduce the costs of unification, the economic gap 
between South and North Korea should be reduced.  The economic gap of the two Koreas 
is huge, as we can see in the Table 5.   
Table 5.   Comparing South and North Korean Economic Strength 
 Unit N.K. S.K. 




Population 1,000 22.709 48.082 2.1 Late 50s 
GNI 100,000 dollars 208 6,810 32.8 Mid 70s 
GNI/1person 1 dollar 914 14,162 15.5 Mid 70s 
Amount of 
trade 




% 13.8 70.2 5.1  
Source: The Korea Development Bank (2005) 
 
Economic inter-change between the two Koreas should be extended.  South-North 
economic inter-change has been accelerated since the Kaesong Industrial Region was 
formed in 2002.  According to the Ministry of Unification, the total output of the 
Kaesong Industrial Complex was over $399.7 million since 2005 and there were 69 
companies and 23,953 North Korean workers in February 2008.172  This kind of 
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economic cooperation will help to reduce the economic gap between two Koreas and 
also, it will help North Koreans stay in North Korea and get jobs in a unified Korea. 
b. Social and Religious Differences 
Even though many South Koreans agree with unification, most people do 
not feel intimacy and even feel awkward about living with North Koreans.  In 2007, a 
survey asked the question “What should the South Korean government focus on to 
prepare unification?”  Thirty-seven percent of people answered “preparing for social and 
cultural shock” and 22.5% of people answered “reducing unification costs.”173  Preparing 
for social and cultural shock was the most important thing to be prepared for before 
unification.  This result showed that the South Korean government needs to focus on 
reducing social differences.  Therefore, to lead a collapsed North Korea to a successful 
unified Korea, the South Korean government should make an effort to reduce social 
differences between the two Koreas and complete social unification. 
According to Lee U Young, a professor of Kyungnam University, social 
unification is defined as “the situation of living together of two separated people who 
overcame conflicts and differences of the two people.”174  Then, what are the conflicts 
and differences of the two people?  First, South Korea has individualistic cultural features 
while North Korea has special features of groupism based on Kim Il Sung’s ideology.  
Secondly, South Korean culture can absorb a variety of cultures of the world, but North 
Korea has a closed culture based on “Juche” ideology.  Thirdly, while South Korea has a 
civil society, North Korea has a dominating society based on a patrimonial regime.  There 
are additional differences, such as language, recent history, and sense of values. 
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 To reduce the social differences and complete social unification, the socio-
cultural community of the two Koreas should be built.  The socio-cultural community has 
been discussed in ‘Korean community unification (1989).’  This plan had three steps of 
unification, and the socio-cultural community was the first step.  Since 1989, the efforts 
to build a socio-cultural community have been made.  The South Korean government 
announced the Five Basic Principles for Inter-Korean Cultural Exchanges in February 
1990 and the government enacted and announced the Inter-Korean Exchanges and 
Cooperation Act in August 1990.  Even though the South Korean government has made 
efforts to build a socio-cultural community, there are still obstacles.  The major obstacle 
is mutual distrust.  Therefore, the South Korean government should make an effort to 
accumulate and gain mutual trust with North Korea. 
 The United States religious statistics website www.adherents.com announced the 
top 10 religions in the world.  Among the 10 religions, North Korean “Juche” was the 
10th religion.  Also, Onnuri Church Pastor Ha said that “North Korean communist party 
officials use the term Trinity when they speak about Kim Il Sung, communist party, and 
the people of North Korea,” and there is a line in the North Korean “Immortality Tower” 
that says “Dear Kim Il Sung is living with us forever.” 175  North Korean “Juche” is more 
than ideology.  It is a religion.  According to KOSIS (Korean Statistical Information 
Service), the people who have no religion make up 46.5% and the people who have 
religion makes up 53.1%. (Of South Koreans:  Buddhism 43.0%, Protestant 34.5%, 
Catholic 20.6%, Confucianism 0.4%, Won-Buddhism 0.5%, and other 1.0%)176  South 
Koreans would not let “Juche” be a part of unified Korean religion therefore, “Juche” 
will be one of the main obstacles of social unification when Korea is unified resulting 
from collapse of North Korea. 
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2. Positive Factors 
a. Unification Education 
South Korean unification education has focused on anti-communism 
education so it has made South Koreans have antipathy toward North Korea.  Also, due 
to the cost of unification which comes from North Korean economic difficulty, South 
Koreans are becoming less positive concerning unification.  To prepare for a North 
Korean collapse and following unification, the South Korean government needs to revise 
unification education. Unification education will have important roles in building 
consensus and support concerning unification among South Koreans. 
According to the “Unification Education Support Law (1999),” unification 
education means “all sorts of education which are based on the faith of liberty-
democracy, ethnic community spirit, a healthy view of national security and have the 
purpose of building a sense of values and behavior which are needed to complete 
unification.”177  Also, it has basic principles: 1) “Unification Education should be 
conducted with the direction of guarding liberty-democratic basic orders and heading to 
peaceful unification.”  2) “Unification Education should not be used for personal and 
factional purposes.”178 
On the contrary, South Korean unification education has had the following 
problems: 
•  Unification education has been the cramming system of education; 
•  It has been the education to make students hate communism; 
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•  Teaching aids are limited so it is difficult to understand North Korea 
correctly; and 
•  Unification education is not future oriented. 
South Korean students study the subject of unification only for test-taking purposes, so 
they just memorize the words in their textbooks.  They do not have enough understanding 
about why communism is wrong and why North Korea has different unification policies 
from South Korea, but memorize the names and dates of unification policies.  This 
narrow understating of unification and North Korea can give students the wrong view 
point of unification and allow them to be deceived by North Korean propaganda 
maneuvers.  Also, teachers who teach unification education subjects have difficulty 
obtaining teaching aids on North Korean because of difficult security systems.179  Lastly, 
the unification education is not future- oriented.  South Korean unification education 
should deal with not only unification policies, security problems, and the real aspects of 
North Korea, but also possible problems in unified Korea, the ability to persuade North 
Koreans of the superiority of democracy, and the ways to live with North Koreans. 
  After a Standing Conference of the Ministers of Education and Cultural 
Affairs of the Länder in the Federal Republic of Germany (KMK) announced the guiding 
principle of unification education (Empfehlungen zur Behandlung der deutschen Frage 
im Unterricht) in school, systematic unification education was started in West Germany.  
This guiding principle of unification education consists of six chapters and the main 
features are as follows:180 
•  The purposes of unification education in West Germany were calling the 
younger generation’s attention to unification, having a deeper 
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understanding of East Germany’s actual circumstances, and establishing 
national homogeneity between East and West Germany 
•  Unification education was not just focused on studying unification 
theories, but also on building the abilities of problem solving in unified 
Germany 
•  Germany means West Germany + East Germany, therefore, West 
Germany emphasized national homogeneity and necessity of unification 
•  West German unification education allows students to naturally realize 
the superiority of West German systems in comparison to East German 
systems  
Besides school unification education, there were other unification 
education institutions in Western Germany.  The Federal Minister of Intra-German 
Relations (Bundesminister für innerdeutsche Beziehungen) was the most active 
institution among them.  The activities of this institution are as follows:181 
•  Collecting data about German problems and offering them to students; 
•  Manufacturing films concerning East German actual circumstances and 
lending them to students; 
•  Holding seminars concerning German unification, comparing the two 
systems, problems of the two German relationships, etc.; and 
•  Offering advice to West German people concerning East German tours of 
the country, sending letters to East Germany, East German people’s 
immigration to West Germany, and so on. 
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Looking West German unification education gives many suggestions as to 
how South Korean unification education can be improved. For example: 
•  South Korean unification education is for recovery of national 
homogeneity; 
•  South Korean government needs to offer students correct and objective 
actual circumstances of North Korea; 
•  Unification education should slough off anti-communist education and 
build the ability of criticism by deep understanding of North Korea; 
•  Unification education should focus not only on current issues of North 
Korea but also future issues in unified Korea; 
•  The South Korean government needs to offer several teaching aids such 
as films, seminars, and other materials; and 
•  Unification education should be conducted not only by schools but also 
social institutions. 
Unification does not just mean unifying two states’ systems, but also means recovery of 
national homogeneity.  Even if South and North Korea unified systematically, the 
unification is not completed.  Completing national homogeneity and the socio-cultural 
community is the last step of unification.  Therefore, the South Korean government needs 
to have long-term plans for unification education.  Unification education should not be 
used for government’s political purposes and it should not change as administration 
changes.   
b. Roles of NGOs 
To build a socio-cultural community, NGOs (Nongovernmental 




increased182 due to the end of the Cold War and NGOs have contributed to the increase in 
socio-cultural interchange and public interest, loosening tension between the two Koreas, 
leading North Korea to open the door, and accumulating mutual trust.183  The importance 
of NGOs is also shown in the case of German unification.  After West and East Germany 
concluded, “the treaty concerning the basis of relations between the Federal Republic of 
Germany and the German Democratic Republic (Basic Treaty)” in 1972, NGOs activities 
accelerated in sports, culture, and several other areas.  After concluding the treaty, 5 
million East German people visited West Germany each year.  The purposes for visiting 
were various: visiting family, taking tours, watching cultural performances, and so on.  
West and East Germans could watch each other’s TV programs.  Thanks to these 
interchanges, West and East Germany could even build a socio-cultural community and 
mutual trust which became the concrete basis for German unification after East German 
collapse.184 
South and North Korean human and material interchange has increased 
because of South Korean democratization, North Korean request of aid, and the 
“Sunshine Policy.”  
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Table 6.   Human and Material Interchange between the Two Koreas 
1. Human interchange 
(Unit: person) 
Year ´89~99 ´00 ´01 ´02 ´03 ´04 ´05 ´06 ´07 
South → North 11,321 7,280 8,551 12,825 15,280 26,213 87,028 100,838 158,170 
North → South 637 706 191 1,052 1,023 321 1,313 870 1,044 
Sum 11,958 7,986 8,742 13,877 16,303 26,534 88,341 101,708 159,214 
* South Korean tourists are not included 
 
2. Shipping 
(Unit: times, 10,000ton) 
Year ´94-99 ´00 ´01 ´02 ´03 ´04 ´05 ´06 ´07 
Shipping times 3,399 2,073 1,686 1,827 2,022 2,124 4,497 8,401 11,891
Amount of shipping 326 70 64 109 105 111 680 1,631 2,511 
(Source: The Ministry of Unification) 
South and North Korean human and material interchange will increase in the future so 
NGO’s role will be more important for South and North Korean unification as we saw in 
the German case.  To increase NGO’s role for unification, the South Korean government 
needs to do such works as follows: 
•  The South Korean government needs to amend laws and systems which 
have been obstacles for NGO’s activities; 
•  Networks among NGOs should be made to information about North 
Korean; 
•  NGO’s activities and governmental policies should be separated and 
NGO’s activities should be affected by the government; 
•  NGO should be specialized in North Korean problems; and 




Recent North Korean nuclear problems made North and South Korean relations worse 
and made it difficult to accumulate mutual trust.  Also, North Korea - U.S. relations make 
it difficult to anticipate future South and North Korean relations.  Therefore, NGOs’ 
activities are becoming more important for building a socio-cultural community and 









One potential scenario regarding the future of North Korea is state collapse and 
unification with South Korea.  Effectively isolated from the international community and 
the world economy, bereft of the great power patronage that it once enjoyed from the 
Soviet Union and China, and enduring economic shortages and distress, Pyongyang faces 
challenges that may cumulatively lead to its dissolution.  Were collapse to occur, many 
surmise, unification with the South seems a plausible consequence and many South 
Koreans expect the consequence. 
However, unification of the Korean peninsula by the South’s absorption of the 
North, faces numerous obstacles.  There are many possible legal and institutional issues 
that would be raised by collapse of North Korea and that would in turn figure into 
prospects for unification with the South. 
These include: 
• South and North Korea’s membership as sovereign states in the United 
Nations; 
• Historical issues stemming from the Korean War, including the continuing 
relevance of the United Nations and Combined Forces Commands; and 
• Legal stipulation incorporated into past North-South agreements, such as 
the 1992 “Inter-Korean Basic Agreement.” 
Adding to the complexity of these issues is the geopolitical context in which their 
resolution must be addressed.  In addition to the goals and policies of Seoul and 
Washington in dealing with state collapse in North Korea, the concerns and approaches 
of Beijing, Moscow, and Tokyo will also have an impact on how these legal and 




 Given these complex issues, it is not a foregone conclusion that North Korea, 
following collapse, may easily be incorporated into a unified Korean state under Seoul’s 
direction.  Therefore, I suggest that the South Korean government needs to prepare for a 
North Korean collapse which could lead a possibly unified Korean state in Seoul’s 
direction.  The suggestions for preparation can be categorized into three areas: 
political/diplomatic, military, and social/economic. 
 Recent reports concerning North Korea say that North Korean leader Kim Jong-
Il’s health is not as good as before, and many North Korean specialists carefully 
anticipate that this may bring a struggle for political power.  Considering the situation, no 
one can confidently anticipate the situation of North Korea in the future.  Therefore, it is 
the right time for the South Korean government to consider all possibilities and prepare 
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